Professional
Malpractice, Punitive Damages Addressed by
the Kentucky Supreme Court
In a December ruling from the
Kentucky Supreme Court, it addressed claims against the Grant Thornton LLP accounting
firm with respect to allegations of professional misconduct involving a
discredited tax shelter. The trial court found that the accounting firm had
engaged in professional malpractice, and in addition to awarding compensatory
damages of some $20 million awarded punitive damages in the amount of $80
million. The Court of Appeals affirmed the determinations of liability and the
compensatory damages, but reduced the punitive damages to $20 million, creating
equivalency (a ratio of 1:1) between the compensatory and punitive damages. On
its review, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the determination of
professional malpractice and the compensatory damages award of $20 million. It
reversed, however, the reduction of the punitive damages award and reinstated
them in the amount of $80 million. Yung v.
Grant Thornton, LLP, 563 S.W.3d 22 (Ky. Dec. 13, 2018).
In 2000, the Yungs purchased
from Grant Thornton the “Grant Thornton Leverage Distribution Product,”
otherwise referred to as “Lev301,” with the aim of repatriating from the Cayman
Islands significant accumulated earnings garnered through the ownership and
operation of hotels and casinos. Grant Thornton represented to Yungs, that through
the use of the Lev301 shelter, those funds could be repatriated without being
subject to federal tax. As recounted by the Kentucky Supreme Court:
As to the
Yungs, the Lev301 involved moving money from the Cayman Islands into the U.S.
by distributing the Cayman corporations’ profits to the shareholders as fully
encumbered securities. First, the Cayman corporations bought $30 million in
Treasury notes (T-notes) using borrowed money, with the T-notes serving as
security for that debt. Next, the corporations transferred the T-notes to the
shareholders in the U.S. Because they
were 1005 encumbered, the T-notes ostensibly had no taxable value, and
accordingly, the shareholders would not report the distributions on their
federal tax returns. The Cayman
corporations would then pay off the debt six months to a year later, but the
loan repayment would also not result in reportable income to the shareholders
because they were not co-obligors for the loan’s repayment. This tax shelter
strategy, Lev301, theoretically allowed the shareholders to avoid tax
consequences on $30 million in profits brought into the U.S. by means of the
eventually unencumbered T-notes. 563 S.W.3d at 32.
The Supreme Court then reviewed
various elements of IRS scrutiny and rejection of tax shelters including the BOSS
Notice and the various disclosures required with respect to purchasers of tax
shelters. Notice 99-59, 1999-52 I.R.B. 761; T.D. 8875, 2000-11 I.R.B. 761. The
Supreme Court also cited an article by Lee Shepperd from Tax Notes, which it says
Grant Thornton was aware of, in which she suggested that transactions similar
to that employed in Lev301 would be disallowed by the IRS. Still, with those limitations
already in place, as well as concerns with respect to other issues including a business
purpose and economic substance, Grant Thornton promoted the Lev301 Program to
the Yungs by means of a meeting with their CFO: In connection therewith, Grant
Thornton:
They did not
disclose that Lev301 was substantially similar to the BOSS; that the February
2000 tax shelter regulations imposed disclosure and listing requirements on
corporate participants in such transactions; that the Treasury would likely
retroactively make Arthur Andersen’s equivalent “Bossy” product unlawful; or
that GT believed that there was a 90% chance that the IRS would disallow the
Lev301 tax benefits on audit. 536 S.W.3d at 35.
The marketing efforts continued
including presentations to members of the Yung Family. During the pendency of
the considerations, Great Thornton represented a “worst-case scenario” by which
there would be impose taxes and interest on the repatriated funds but there would
not be interest., This in opposition to the known treatment of transactions falling
within the scope of the BOSS Notice. When Yung indicated they did not want to be
the first out of the gate and therefore the “guinea pig” on the Lev301 structure,
it was thereafter represented to him, “without any factual basis” that two local
companies had used the strategy. 536 S.W.3d at 37.
Then, notwithstanding additional
action by the IRS and an article in the Wall Street Journal, it was represented
to the client that there was not a problem. This was done even though Grant
Thornton had otherwise suspended efforts to sell the Lev301 product. Also,
Grant Thornton made a “business decision” to not maintain the required list of investors
and did not advise the client of that IRS imposed obligation. Likewise not disclosed
to the client was that the outside law firm retained to review the Grant Thornton
“more likely than not opinion refused to endorse it on bases including that the
transaction did not satisfy business purpose, economic substance and separate transaction
issues. Still, the closing on the transaction proceeded on December 29, 2000
with Grant Thornton committing to deliver a “more likely than not” opinion letter
notwithstanding that, internally, they could not come to that level of confidence.
Within days thereafter, the
Treasury Department issued temporary and proposed regulations that invalidated
the Lev301 structure, they collectively invalidating the suggestion that the recourse
liability to the company making the distribution would reduce, as to the shareholder,
the value of the distributed assets. Even in the base of that authority, Grant
Thornton made several representations to the Yungs that the transaction was not
in trouble.
Ultimately, by means of an audit
of Grant Thornton, the IRS learned of the Yungs’ participation in the Lev301 transaction.
They were in turn audited, and the IRS assessed back taxes and penalties, resulting
in a settlement. The Yungs then initiated suit against Grant Thornton.
A bench trial lasting 22 days
and more than 600 documents, as well as 40 witnesses, yielded a return to the Yungs
of the $900,000 engagement fee paid to Grant Thornton, taxes, interest and penalties
of approximately $19 Million, an additional $80 Million in punitive damages.
As noted above, the determination
of liability was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, but the punitive damages were
reduced to approximately $20 Million yielding a 1:1 ratio between compensatory
and punitive damages.
In its decision, the initial substantive
determination is that, under Kentucky law, tax and related interest liability will
be recoverable, notwithstanding Grant Thornton’s argument that those payments put
the Yungs in a position better than they would have been absent the Lev301 transaction.
Specifically:
[W]e join
those jurisdictions that deem the issue of whether the plaintiff has actually been damaged by incurring tax and
interest liability a question of fact.
Consequently, we refuse to adopt the blanket “matter of law” rule
advocated by GT forbidding tax and IRS interest recovery in accounting fraud
and negligence actions. Under our
traditional tort damage principles, if the taxpayer has been injured, recovery
should be allowed if the taxpayer meets the burden of proving causation and
damages. Therefore, if the tax liability
(i.e., taxes and interest paid to the IRS) is a direct result of an
accounting’s fraudulent or negligent conduct, a plaintiff’s out-of-pocket
damages are recoverable. Ultimately, the
issue depends on the circumstances of each case, and in this case, we conclude
the trial court properly awarded taxes and interest as compensatory damages.
563 S.W.3d at 59-60.
Turning to the topic of punitive
damages, the Supreme Court began by holding that the Court Of Appeals does have
the capacity to order remittitur of punitive damages. From their return to the question
of whether the initial award of $80 Million of punitive damages was constitutionally
excessive. Applying a de novo standard
of review and KRS § 411.184, the Supreme Court found Grant Thornton’s conduct
to have satisfied the reprehensible element of punitive damages, it observed:
Over the
course of time, despite multiple IRS notices and regulations, professional
articles, opinions of outside legal counsel, and internal confusion alerting GT
that the Lev301 was likely an abusive tax shelter and IRS regulations likely
would apply retroactively to the Yungs’ detriment, GT never once disclosed to
the Yungs the problems with the Lev301 concept in general nor specifically,
e.g., the use of a recourse bank loan and the need for a stated business
purpose for the transaction. When the
Yungs discovered on their own that the IRS could possibly disallow the Lev301
tax benefits and communicated that concern to GT, GT misrepresented its
confidence in the product. Although GT stopped selling Lev301 multiple times in
response to IRS notices and new regulations, the Yungs were not told even once
about the cessation of sales of an increasingly dubious product. At one point, the Yungs’ Lev301 use was
described as a successful sale to GT’s staff for promotional purposes and the
staff was also told, despite it not being so, that the Lev301 was vetted and
approved by outside counsel. Furthermore, although the Yungs were never
informed of the problems associated with their particular transaction, the
knowledge of those problems (e.g., recourse loan, business purpose) was reflected
in numerous internal communications with GT and personnel sought to avoid like
circumstances with other sales. When GT
was subject to an IRS examination because of the Lev301, GT did not inform the
Yungs; instead these “trusting” clients learned of the scrutiny from a tax
publication.
These various
misrepresentations and nondisclosures were made to save the $900,000 deal and
to cover GT’s negligent and fraudulent acts that accumulated over time. This summary of GT’s grossly negligent and
fraudulent behavior does not fully reflect GT’s reprehensible behavior in the
marketing and sale of the Lev301 to the Yungs.
In our view, these individual and cumulative acts place GT’s behavior
toward their clients at the high end of professional reprehensibility. Although
the Yungs may not have been financially vulnerable, the reprehensibility of
GT’s orchestrated, on-going deceit is not lessened or mitigated by the fact GT
defrauded people of wealth, rather than the financially vulnerable. We noted
above in the discussion of justifiable reliance that a plaintiff’s wealth and
business experience cannot preclude a finding of reliance on that plaintiff’s
trusted accounting and tax advisors nor should it preclude a punitive damage
award where the advisors’ conduct is reprehensible. 563 S.W.3d at 67. (emphasis in original).
Turning to the ratio, it was held
that the 4.1 ratio here applied was acceptable “We do not view the $80 million punitive
damage award to be disproportionate to the harm suffered by the Yungs.”
Last, turning to an the question
of whether there was a disparity between the compensatory and punitive damages,
in what can at least in part the characterize as a conclusory determination, it
was held that this element was satisfied.