On Charging Orders, Bankruptcy, and the Scope of the
Automatic Stay
In a recent decision out of Louisiana, the Federal District
Court, sitting as the appellate court from a Bankruptcy Court, pointed out some
important issues to be considered in connection with the bankruptcy of an
individual member of an LLC and the scope of the automatic stay. In this
instance, certain of those important matters had not been fully considered by
the Bankruptcy Court. For that reason, remand was ordered. In the Matter of: Thomas Mack and Mary Susan Mack, Civ. Act. No.
17-3587, 2018 WL 1532979 (E.D. LA. March 29, 2018).
Consequent to some financial setbacks, Thomas Mack, along
with certain others, was held liable to First Bank for some $400,000 plus
attorneys’ fees and additional collection costs. Mack, in turn, was a member in
two LLCs, but the only one relevant to the opinion was Matrix Hospitality Group,
L.L.C. Therein, he held a 60% membership interest, and apparently it was only
through Matrix that Mack had any income, specifically:
Mack is paid by Matrix in three
ways: (1) a monthly salary as a 1099 employee; (2) a periodic disbursement of
profits as a part-owner; and (3) a performance bonus paid in April by
particular clients if Matrix is able to meet client-set goals.
Seeking to collect on the judgment debt of approximately
$400,000, First Bank sought a charging order against Mack’s interest in Matrix.
The charging order was awarded and served on the company, but it failed to
respond in accordance with Louisiana procedure. In addition, Matrix made distributions
to Mack after the charging order was served. When legal action was then
initiated against Matrix, Mack (both Thomas and Mary Susan) filed for Chapter
11 bankruptcy. At that point, the value of First Bank’s judgment had increased
to $789,212.85.
From there the chronology of what happened gets somewhat
confusing. What is known is that, on January 31, 2017, First Bank moved for
relief from the automatic stay. Ultimately that relief was denied.
The reason this is confusing is that when a member files for
bankruptcy, and the LLC is not itself in bankruptcy, and activities of the LLC
are not automatically subject to the automatic stay there is an exception to
this rule when, in the presence of “unusual circumstances,” “there is such
identity between the debtor and the third-party defendant at the debtor may be
said to be the real party defendant and that a judgment against the third-party
defendant will in effect be a judgment or finding against the debtor.” 2018 WL
1532979, *3. In those circumstances, the automatic stay may extend to a
non-debtor, in this instance Matrix. In this instance, however,:
The Court is unable to evaluate the
Bankruptcy Court’s decision in denying the modification of the scope [of the
automatic stay] because the Bankruptcy Court never made a finding on whether
the scope of the stay included Matrix. Although it is arguably implied that the
Bankruptcy Court determined that it did because it denied First Bank’s motion
for relief, neither party raised the issue and the Bankruptcy Court did not
state on the record whether the automatic stay applies to Matrix. Further, the
Bankruptcy Court held that First Bank had the burden to modify the automatic
stay, but the appellees [i.e., Mack],
the parties seeking to maintain the stay, actually had the burden. The
Bankruptcy Court failed to apply the appropriate standard to determine if
modifying the stay was appropriate. Because the Bankruptcy Court did not
require the appellees to meet their burden, the factual record is not
sufficiently developed for this Court to determine whether the circumstances
justify the rare finding that the stay applies to non-debtors [i.e. Matrix].
Id. (bracketed
language added).
So the matter will go back to the Bankruptcy Court to
determine whether Matrix and Mack are of such unitary interests that First Bank
cannot, outside of the bankruptcy proceedings, seek to enforce its judgment by
means of a charging order.
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