Treatment of
Physicians as Hospital's Independent Contractors Upheld
In a recent decision, Kentucky
Court of Appeals has given extensive consideration to the question of whether
physicians rendering services at a hospital would be treated as employees (and
therefore agents) or independent contractors.
In this instance, the patient in question had on repeated occasions
signed a document acknowledging that the physicians are independent contractors
and not employees. An effort to
challenge that characterization subsequent to his death was rejected. Rains
v. St. Joseph Healthcare, Inc., 2012 WL 4208772 (Ky. App. Sept. 21, 2012)
(Not To Be Published).
Bobby Rains was admitted to St.
Joseph’s hospital in January, 2007 whereat he underwent several paracentesis
procedures by Drs. Dunkle-Blatter and Estridge, which procedures (it was later alleged)
were performed improperly. Ultimately,
Bobby Rains was transferred to University of Kentucky Medical Center, where he
died. Lisa Rains, as the surviving
spouse and heir and as well the administratrix of Bobby’s estate, filed suit
against various parties including St. Joseph Healthcare, alleging that “SJH was
vicariously liable for the aforementioned doctors’ alleged negligence under a
theory of ostensible agency.” The trial
court granted St. Joseph Healthcare summary judgment and this appeal followed.
At the time of his admission
and several times subsequent thereto, Bobby signed an authorization providing
in part:
I understand that physicians, surgeons,
radiologists, pathologists, anestheosiologists, other doctors and physicians
assistants who may render care or services in my case are not employees or
agents of St. Joseph’s Healthcare, Inc.
It was
on the basis of this release that the trial court granted summary judgment.
On appeal, Lisa asserts the trial
court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of SJH because a genuine
issue of fact exists as to SJH’s liability under an ostensible agency theory,
based upon the inadequate and improper consent form presented for Bobby’s
signature. We disagree.
Ultimately, the Court of
Appeals forged no new Kentucky law on this point, but was rather able to dispose
of the argument through citation to prior authority, namely:
An apparent or ostensible agent is
not an actual agent, but is “‘one whom the principal, either intentionally or
by want of ordinary care, induces third persons to believe to be his agent,
although he has not, either expressly or by implication, conferred authority upon
him.’” Middleton v. Frances,
257 Ky. 42, 44, 77 S.W.2d 425, 426 (1934) (citation omitted). The general
premise in Kentucky is that hospitals are not vicariously liable for doctors
who are not its employees under an ostensible agency theory so long as the
hospital makes the patient aware that the treating physician is not a hospital
employee when the treatment was performed. See Paintsville Hosp. Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255, 256 (Ky. 1985). See
also Floyd v. Humana of Virginia, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 267, 270 (Ky. App. 1989) (medical malpractice
plaintiff could not hold hospital liable for alleged negligence of physician on
ostensible agency theory where admission forms read and signed by plaintiff
indicated her knowledge that doctors were independent contractors and not
agents of hospital, and no representation or action was made so as to induce
plaintiff to believe that doctors were employees or agents of hospital); Roberts
v. Galen of Virginia, Inc.,
111 F.3d 405, 412-13 (6th Cir. 1997) (under Kentucky law, hospital is not
liable under ostensible agency doctrine for alleged negligence of independent
contractor physicians where hospital's patient registration and authorization
form alerted the public that its physicians are not its employees or agents), rev’d on other grounds, 525 U.S. 249,
119 S. Ct. 685, 142 L.Ed.2d 648 (1999); Vandevelde v. Poppens, 552 F.Supp.2d 662, 667 (W.D. Ky. 2008)
(hospital not vicariously liable under Kentucky law for alleged negligence of
physicians based on an ostensible agency theory where hospital’s consent upon
admission forms alerted the public that its physicians were not its employees
or agents); Johnston v. Sisters of Charity of Nazareth Health Sys., Inc., 2003 WL 22681562 at *3 (Ky. App.
Nov. 14, 2003) (hospital not liable under ostensible agency theory where
patient signed admission forms on six different occasions which explicitly
stated that pathologists and physicians at hospital were independent
contractors and not employees or agents of hospital).
In this case, the record reflects
that on seven separate occasions, beginning in March 2005 and ending with a
final admission in January 2007, Bobby signed an SJH form entitled “Authorizations
and Consents.” This one-page form, which was identical in all material respects
at each admission, is not complex and is not drafted in legalistic language.
Paragraph eight of the form, immediately preceding his signature, informed him
that “physicians, surgeons, radiologists, pathologists, anesthesiologists,
other doctors, and physicians assistants who may render care or services in
[his] case are not employees or agents of Saint Joseph HealthCare, Inc.” No
evidence was presented to show that SJH represented to the public that the
doctors working within the confines of the hospital were its employees or
agents. Thus, as a matter of law, SJH cannot be held vicariously liable for the
alleged negligence of the doctors under an ostensible agency theory.
There was a dissenting opinion
by Judge Caperton wherein he reviewed cases addressing apparent agency and as
well the Restatement (Third) of Agency. In effect, he argues that there remains a question of fact
as to whether Bobby Rains, notwithstanding the signed agreement stating that
all physicians are independent contractors, actually appreciated that the
doctors were not employees and agents of the hospital. Ergo, the signed consent would become only
part of the evidence as to whether or not the physicians were agents of the
hospital.
No comments:
Post a Comment