Showing posts sorted by relevance for query tarter. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query tarter. Sort by date Show all posts

Friday, June 21, 2019

Federal District Court Addresses Derivative Actions, Allows Case to Proceed


Federal District Court Addresses Derivative Actions, Allows Case to Proceed

       In January 2018, the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky (Judge Reeves) dismissed, without prejudice, a lawsuit brought in connection with a number of family-owned business entities, it being alleged that those in control had manipulated the structure to divert to themselves nearly $75 million. The primary bases for that dismissal was the absence of demand upon those in control of the corporations and LLCs to take action. See Smith v. Tarter, 305 F.Supp.3d 733, 2018 WL 506227 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 22, 2018). HERE IS A LINK to my review of that decision.

      In what may be fairly characterized as “Round II” to this dispute, the plaintiffs have re-filed the action after taking a variety of actions including calling board meetings and submitting written demands for action. With the case now pending before Judge Caldwell, she has generally found the complaint is sufficient to proceed. C-Ville Fabricating, Inc. v. Tarter, Civ. Act. No. 5:18-CV-379-KKC, 2019 WL 1368621 (E.D. Ky. March 26, 2019).
      Judge Caldwell noted that in the prior action, it had been concluded that an individual shareholder does not have standing to bring a direct cause of action when the only injury being asserted is dimunition in the value of the corporate shares. 2019 WL 1368621, *5, citing 305 F.Supp.3d at 739. Likewise, Judge Reeves had held that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the futility exception applied. 2019 WL 1368621, *5, citing 305 F.Supp.3d at 742-44.
      Since then, the plaintiffs have taken a number of actions. First, they sent a round of demand letters to the current directors and managers of the various companies that “explicitly requested the Boards of the corporations and the member/managers of the LLCs to vote on the specific issue of whether to sue the Defendants - Joshua Tarter, Thomas Gregory, and QMC for their supposed misdeeds.” 2019 WL 1368621, *5.  Secondly, the plaintiffs called a meeting of the Board of Directors of Tarter Industries that passed a resolution authorizing the corporation to bring suit against the defendants. They then filed this new action. As described by Judge Caldwell, “the Plaintiffs argue that the standing deficiencies of their first complaint have been cured, pointing to the newly issued demand letters and the Tarter Industries Board resolution.” Id. *6. In response, defendants brought a number of motions to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

      Initially, with respect to the plaintiffs’ assertions that they individually had standing to pursue the claims, as they had been in the initial action, those claims were dismissed.
       With respect to the direct action authorized by Tarter Industries against the defendants, they challenged the resolutions authorizing those suits on a variety of basis including who received notice and assertions of bad faith and inherent conflict of interest. Factually, it was found that the proper persons received proper notice of the meeting. The charge that one of the parties to that vote had a conflict of interest based upon the assertion that, if one of the defendants were found liable he would be required to give up his shares and shift them to her side of the family, thereby giving them control, was found to be speculative and at least at this stage of the dispute insufficient to require an abstention. On those bases, the direct suit by Tarter Industries against the defendants was allowed to proceed.
      With respect to a derivative standing, the defendants began with an assertion that the plaintiff actors “are not the ‘fair and adequate’ representatives of the other shareholders of the Tarter Companies, citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1(a), under which a derivative proceeding “ ‘may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or members who are similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation.’” 2019 WL 1368621, *9. The court recited the eight factors utilized in the Sixth Circuit, as set forth in Davis v. Comed, Inc., 619 F.2d 588, 593-94 (6th Cir. 1980). Judge Caldwell would find that the claims that the plaintiffs were not “fair and adequate” representatives were unavailing and that “on balance, [ ]  the plaintiffs have adequately pleaded that they are fair and adequate representatives of the shareholders of the Tarter Companies.” Id., *10. The plaintiffs then went on to challenge the demand letters on the basis that they were sent to those who “might be Directors” this was found to be unavailing. Rather, while there was some confusion as to who might be directors and officers of various companies, a consequence of numerous failures to hold annual meetings and elect directors, the sending of demand letters to every possible recipient was the appropriate approach. An assertion that the failure to take action by the Board of Directors should be protected by the Business Judgment Rule was rejected because of an absence of a showing of any investigation.
      From there the court turned to a variety of defenses under Rule 12(b)(6) with respect to RICO, Defend Trade Secrets Act and Kentucky Uniform Trade Secret Law. A claim for misappropriation under the Defend Trade Secrets Act was upheld even as claims for aiding and abetting breach of the DSTA were dismissed on the grounds that it does not provide for aiding and abetting liability. Likewise, a claim for conspiracy to misappropriate under the DTSA was struck down on the basis that there is no claim for conspiracy to misappropriate. A direct claim under the Kentucky Uniform Trade Secrets Act was allowed to proceed while aiding and abetting and conspiracy claims thereunder were dismissed. Likewise, RICO claims were allowed to proceed. The court found that, for example, the predicate act of money laundering had taken place. In addition, a faithless servant doctrine claim was set aside, there being a lack of authority for the proposition that the Kentucky Supreme Court would adopt that doctrine when presented with the opportunity.
      For now, this lawsuit will proceed on a direct and derivative basis.

Wednesday, January 31, 2018

Federal District Court Addresses Corporate and LLC Derivative Actions, Pleading of Futility


Federal District Court Addresses Corporate and
LLC Derivative Actions, Pleading of Futility

      In a decision issued last week by the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky (Judge Reeves), there was addressed the requirements for bringing a direct, versus a derivative, action in the context of both the corporation and the LLC. Also considered in detail was the requirements for pleading demand futility. Smith v. Tarter, No. 5:17-334-DCR, 2018 WL 506227 (E.D. Ky. January 22, 2018).
      Smith, along with other individuals, filed, in the alternative, direct and derivative claims with respect to a corporation, the Tarter Companies, identified as “the largest manufacturer of farm gates and animal management equipment in North America,” and certain related LLCs. It was alleged that defendants Joshua Tarter and Thomas Gregory, including a company they organized, all were funneling assets of the Tarter Companies to themselves. Specifically, they used a company they organized, QMC Industry Company, Ltd. (“QMC”), as the vehicle through which they would source products in China. However, Tarter and Gregory would cause QMC to markup its prices vis-à-vis what it was paying the Chinese manufacturer, in effect capturing, uniquely for themselves, some of the cost savings that would have otherwise been enjoyed by the Tarter Companies.
      In response to the complaint, the defendants filed a  motion to dismiss.
      The court began its analysis with the direct claims bought with respect to the corporation’s, beginning its analysis by noting that the plaintiffs “have not alleged that they sustained any personal injuries apart from the costs and a loss of cost savings allegedly incurred by the Tarter Companies.” 2018 WL 506227,*4. Then applying the rule that a shareholder may not bring a personal claim unless they are able to show injury other than to the corporation, and that claims based upon the diminution of share value are derivative in nature, the direct claims were dismissed for lack of standing.
      Turning to the direct claims brought with respect to the LLCs, the plaintiffs asserted that they had the standing to bring them as, inter alia, they are parties to the operating agreement and the defendants were charged with violating same. Judge Reeves rejected this assertion, holding rather that, again, the alleged injuries were to the business entity, and in consequence thereof any suit to remedy same needed to be on a derivative basis. He cited in support KRS § 275.337. To that end, the court wrote:
The plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that they sustained any injury as members of the Tartar LLCs that is not indirect or incidental to the Tartar LLCs’ expenditure of costs and loss of cost savings. As a result, they lack standing to bring an individual capacity action to redress those injuries. Accordingly, the plaintiffs lacked standing to maintain an individual capacity action either as shareholders of the Tartar Corporations or as members of the Tartar LLCs, and their individual capacity claims must be dismissed. 2018 WL 506227, *5.

      Turning then to the derivative counts, the court began by noting the “heightened pleading standards” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 applicable with respect to derivative actions, particularly the obligation that the plaintiff “state with particularity” the efforts “made to prod the entity into bringing the action on its own behalf, and any reason the plaintiff failed to make such an effort or the effort was unsuccessful”. In addition to FRCP 23.1, there were cited the equivalent provisions of the Kentucky Business Corporation and the Kentucky Limited Liability Company Acts.
      Relying upon both Kentucky and Delaware law, the situations in which demand futility is available were discussed. Here, it was found that the only defendant with an ownership interest in the Tartar Companies is Joshua Tartar, owning 16.6%. The plaintiffs own 50% of that company, and the remaining balance of 33.47% was owned by non-parties to this action who are members of Joshua Tarter’s family. It was determined that the plaintiffs had not plead with particularity why those other owners could not or would not exercise legitimate business judgment with respect to the matter. Specifically, the plaintiffs had failed to make “particularized factual allegations” that would give rise to “a reasonable doubt” that the siblings would “not exercise independent and disinterested business judgment.” 2018 WL 506227, *6. In this respect, the court adopted a Delaware rule as to determining whether a director is interested in a transaction thereby unable to exercise independent business judgment:
Under Delaware law, a director is considered “interested” if he or she: (i) received a personal financial benefit that was not shared by the other stockholders from the challenged conduct; (ii) might suffer a “materially detrimental impact” from the proposed legal action; or (iii) was incapable, due to domination and control, of objectively evaluating a demand to assert the company’s claims. 2018 WL 506227, *7 (citations omitted).
      In that the plaintiffs had not alleged any of these disabling factors, they had not satisfied their obligation to plead demand futility. Rather, “The plaintiffs have plead no facts indicating that the desire to maintain control of 50% of the Tartar Companies together with Joshua Tartar would undermine Joshua Tartar’s siblings’ independent judgment.” Id.
      The complaint was dismissed without prejudice, so subject to statute of limitations issues, presumably, after appropriate demand, the complaint could be refiled.
      I do have a quibble with the opinion, where it provides:
Griffin [v. Jones, 170 F. Supp. 3d 956 (W.D. Ky. 2016)] and Patmon [v. Hobbs, 280 S.W. 3d 589 (Ky. App. 2009)] established that, under Kentucky law, a managing member of a limited liability company (“LLC”) owes fiduciary duties both to the LLC and its individual members.
Not recognized in this decision is that after the Patmon decision, KRS § 275.170, it defining the fiduciary obligations that are owed in LLCs, was revised, eviscerating most of the Patmon decision (it as well has been essentially set aside by the third opinion of the Court of Appeals in that case) and that this case involves an alleged breach of the duty of loyalty, which is owed only to the company (and not inter se of members). In addition, fiduciary duties, including as to who owes them and to whom, are subject to being altered in the operating agreement.  A reference to the default rule has validity if and only if it has been first determined that the operating agreement did not set forth a different formula.  Maybe, in this instance the operating agreement was silent as to whom the duties were owed, and the default rule applied.  Alternatively, the operating agreement was never reviewed. Either way, the opinion does not say.