Friday, July 8, 2016

West Virginia Court Incorrectly Applies Corporate Diversity of Citizenship Rules to LLC


West Virginia Court Incorrectly Applies Corporate Diversity of Citizenship Rules to LLC

 

            With due respect to the court, the application of the rules for determining the citizenship of a corporation (i.e., the state of incorporation and the state in which the principal place of business as determined under the “nerve center” test) to an LLC is inappropriate.  That is, however, exactly what happened in a recent decision from West Virginia.  KJBL, LLC v. EnerVest Operating, LLC, Civil Act. No. 1:16CV55, 2016 WL 3566865 (N.D. W. Va. June 27, 2016).

            KJBL, LLC and two individuals filed suit against EnerVest, LLC in West Virginia state court alleging that the defendant has mismanaged certain oil and gas properties in which the plaintiffs hold working and overriding royalty interests.  EnerVest removed the action to federal court of the basis of diversity jurisdiction.  The plaintiffs sought a remand on the basis that Enervest is a citizen of West Virginia on the basis that its principal place of business, determined under the nerve center test, is in West Virginia.  The court wrote that:

The question presented in whether EnerVests’s nerve center, and therefore its principal place of business, is in Houston, Texas or Charleston, West Virginia. 

The reason the court was concerned with where is Enervest’s principal place of business was stated to be:

An unincorporated association, including an LLC, is a citizen of the state where it has its principal place of business and the state under whose law it is organized. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1o).  An LLC is also assigned the citizenship of each of its members.

The problem with this statement of the law is that it is largely incorrect.  Initially, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(10) is the “Class Action Fairness Act,” wherein Congress adopted “minimal diversity” as the requirement for certain class action.  It is not applicable to an action, such as this lawsuit, that is not a class action.

            Next, the citizenship of an LLC (such as the defendant in this action) is determined exclusively by reference to the citizenship of its members; a small sampling of the cases espousing that rule is recited below. It has been expressly recognized in the Fourth Ciruit, of which West Virginia is a part.  See Central West Virginia Energy Company, Inc. v. Mountain State Carbon, LLC, 636 F.3d 101 (4th Cir. 2011), “For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the citizenship of a limited liability company (such as Mountain State) is determined by the citizenship of all of its members (such as Severstal Wheeling).”  If one of those members is itself an unincorporated organization such as an LLC or limited partnership, the analysis must continue through the layers until it reaches corporations or natural persons with citizenship.  See, e.g., Delay v. Rosenthal Collins Group, LLC, 585 F.3d 1003, 1005 (6th Cir. 2009) (“When diversity jurisdiction is invoked in a case in which a limited liability company is a party, the court needs to know the citizenship of each member of the company.  And because a member of a limited liability company may itself have multiple members – and thus may itself have multiple citizenships – the federal court needs to know the citizenship of each ‘sub-member’ as well.”).

In that citizenship is determined by the citizenship of the members, an LLC is not a citizen of either the jurisdiction of organization or of its principal place of business unless one of its members has that citizenship.  Put another way, neither the jurisdiction of organization nor the jurisdiction in which the principal place of business is maintained by an LLC have any bearing upon the question of the LLC’s citizenship for purposes of diversity. Cases as to this point are collected below.

            In its Notice of Removal, at paragraph 5, EnerVest stated:

EnerVest is a Delaware limited liability company.  The members and owners of EnerVest are EnerVest, Ltd., EnerVest Advisors, Ltd. And Jones EnerVest, Ltd., which are all Texas limited partnerships.  The corporate headquarters and nerve center of EnerVest and its members is located in Houston Texas.

            But that is not the question.  EnerVest is a citizen of every state in which any of its members is a citizen – where EnerVest is organized and where it maintains its principal place of business are irrelevant to the question.  As each of the members of the EnerVest LLC is itself a limited partnership, what matters is the citizenship of the general and limited partners thereof. 

            With due respect to the Court, the wrong question has here been considered.  Diversity may exist, or it may not.  But only upon an examination as to the citizenship of the plaintiff LLC and the defendant LLC, through as many layers as are necessary, will it be known whether the parties are truly diverse.

 

 

 

► An LLC is a citizen of each jurisdiction in which any of its members are citizens:

 

Homfeld II, L.L.C. v. Comair Holdings, Inc., 53 Fed. Appx. 731, 2002 WL 31780184 (6th Cir. 2003) (adopting the rule of Cosgrove v. Bartolotta in the 6th Circuit to the effect that “a limited liability company is not treated as a corporation and has the citizenship of its members.”)

 

Delay v. Rosenthal Collins Group, LLC, 585 F.3d 1003, 1005 (6th Cir. 2009) (reiterating the Homfeld decision to the effect that an LLC “has the citizenship of each of its members.”)

 

Realco Ltd. Liability Co. v. AK Steel Corp., 2008 WL 19990810 (E.D. Ky 2008) (“It is well established that an LLC has the citizenship of each of its members.”) (citing Homfeld II, LLC v. Comair Holdings, Inc., 2002 WL 31780184 (6th Cir. 2002)).

 

Rich & Rich Partnership v. Poetman Records USA, 2008 WL 1868028 (E.D. Ky. 2008).

 

Gibraltar Kentucky Development, LLC v. Cantrell, 2008 WL 1771921 (E.D. Ky. 2008). 

 

► Jurisdiction of organization and of principal place of business of LLC do not confer citizenship:

 

Citizens Bank v. Plasticware, LLC, 2011 WL 5598883 (E.D. Ky. 2011) (“Plasticware’s principal place of business, however, is not relevant to its citizenship determination.”)

Marom v. JBS USA LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78116 (D. Conn. June 5, 2012) (“citizenship of a limited liability company is not the state in which it is organized or has its principal place of business, but rather, each of the states in which it has members.”)

Ludell Manufacturing Company v. Leisure Pools USA, LLC, Case No. 13-C-133 (E.D. Wisc. Feb. 14, 2013) (“However, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the citizenship of a limited liability company is determined by the citizenship of all its members, not on its principal place of business or the jurisdiction under whose laws it is organized.”)

Master v. Quiznos Franchise Co., 2007 WL 419287 (D. N.J. Feb. 1, 2007) (“limited liability companies are (1) unincorporated associations, and (2) deemed citizens of each state in which their members are citizens, not the states in which they were formed or have their principal places of business.”)

JMTR Enterprises, L.L.C. v. Duchin,  42 F. Supp.2d 87 (D. Mass. 1999) (the citizenship of a LLC is determined is that of the citizenship of its members, and it is not deemed a citizen of the state in which it is organized)

Muhlenbeck v. KI, LLC, 304 F. Supp.2d 797, 2004 WL 292111 (E.D. Va. 2004) (“[T]he citizenship of a limited liability company depends not on the state in which it is organized or the state in which it does most of its business, but rather on the citizenship of the entities that own the LLC.”)

IFC Credit Corp. v. Mahon, 2003 WL 503601 (N.D. Ill. February 24, 2003) (characterizing as “wholly irrelevant for diversity purposes” the jurisdiction of formation and the principal place of business of a limited liability company.)

TPS Utilicom Services, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 223 F. Supp.2d 1089, 1102 (N.D. Ca. 2002) (“[T]he place of organization of an L.L.C. is not relevant to its citizenship for diversity purposes.”)

Bank One Nat. Ass’n v. Pickens, 2002 WL 1008456 (D.C. Ill. 2002) (the principal place of business of a partnership or any other unincorporated association, as well as its jurisdiction of formation, are totally irrelevant for purposes of determining whether diversity is present)

Johnson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 724 F.2d 337, 348 (3rd Cir. 2013) (the principal place of business of n unincorporated entity is therefore irrelevant to determining its citizenship)

Rupp v. City Brewing Company, LLC, No. 12-CV-676-BBC (W.D. Wisc. May 21, 2013) (the citizenship of a limited liability company is not determined by the state in which it is organized or the location of its principal place of business)

Principle Solutions LLC v. Feed.Ing BV, Case No. 13-C-223 (E.D. Wisc. June 5, 2013) (the allegation of a limited liability company’s principal place of business is irrelevant to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction)

Wednesday, July 6, 2016

Distributions to Working Interest Holder in Oil & Gas Venture Held Subject to Self-Employment Tax

Distributions to Working Interest Holder in Oil & Gas Venture Held
Subject to Self-Employment Tax

 
            Recently, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a determination that the holder of  working interests in an oil and gas ventures was a partner in a partnership and in consequence the distributions from the venture were subject to self-employment tax.  Methvin v. Commissioner, No. 15-9005, ___ Fed. App’x ___, 2016 WL 3457623 (10th Cir. June 24, 2016).

            Methvin owned various 2-3% working interests in certain oil and gas ventures.  In 2011, he received certain distributions on which he paid income tax, but no self-employment tax.  The IRS sought $690 in self-employment tax.  Methvin objected to that levy, asserting (it would appeal from the decision) that he was not a partner and the distributions were not subject to self-employment tax.  He lost on that argument when presented to the Tax Court (referred to in this decision once as the “district court”), and he lost again before the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. The Tax Court’s decision is Methvin v. Commissioner, No. 28477–13, T.C. Memo. 2015-81 (April 27, 2015).

            Initially, the 10th Circuit affirmed the determination that, based upon the facts here at issue, there existed a partnership between Methvin and the operator of the wells.  While he argued he was only a passive investor, he had extensive rights under the agreements particular to these ventures including the rights to:

• inspect receipts, vouchers, insurance policies, legal opinions, drilling logs and reports, copies of drill stem tests, core analyses, electrical surveys, geological reports, and other records involving wells that had been drilled;

• audit the books and records;
• enter the property to inspect the operations;
• obtain any information reasonably requested regarding development and operation; and
• inspect the operator’s records.

Further, Methvin shared certain obligations as to expenses.  On these facts the determination that a partnership existed was affirmed.  There being a partnership, self-employment taxes were due and owing on the distributions made.

            It needs to be emphasized that the determination that a partnership existed was made on the facts and circumstances of this particular arrangement.  Methvin argued that the specifics of this arrangement were sufficiently different from those of Cokes v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 222 (1988), wherein a partnership was also found, that no such determination should here be made.  That effort of distinguishing was not successful.  Rather:

These differences might have led the Tax Court to arrive at a different factual finding here, for “each case must rest on its own facts.” Jones v. Baker, 189 F.2d 842, 844 (10th Cir. 1951). But the Tax Court did not clearly err by characterizing Mr. Methvin’s arrangement with the operator as a partnership. In the absence of clear error, we uphold the Tax Court’s finding that the arrangement constituted a partnership.  (footnote omitted). 

            Persons holding oil and gas interests need to carefully consider whether they are in partnerships and are therefore subject to self-employment taxes on their distributions.  This is a particularly involved question of law for which attention to the details of each particular arrangement are necessary.

 

Tuesday, July 5, 2016

Heavy Thinking on Hot Coffee Cases


Heavy Thinking on Hot Coffee Cases


            Several of the law professors who write the Business Law Prof Blog have been considering whether a customer has a claim when they are burned by spilled hot coffee (not to be confused with whether one, in addition to a good cry, is entitled to sue over spilled milk). It seems a small problem, but they analysis is interesting.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2016/06/some-dont-like-it-hot-1.html

Wednesday, June 22, 2016

Once Again, An LLC and Its Members Are Legally Distinct


Once Again, An LLC and Its Members Are Legally Distinct
      In a recent decision by a federal court in Virginia, the court held, inter alia, that “Question Eight” on an insurance application about prior criminal acts of the “applicant,” where the applicant for the insurance policy is the LLC, did not extend to any criminal activity by that LLC’s sole member. Jeb Stuart Auction Services, LLC v. West American Insurance Co., Case No. 4:14-cv-00047 (2016 WL 3365495 (W.D. Va. June 16, 2016).
      Jeb Stuart Auction Services, LLC (“Jeb Stuart”) was a single member LLC wholly owned by Robin Hiatt. Jeb Stuart applied for an insurance policy to be issued by West American, West American being represented by Burch Hodges Stone, Inc. With respect to a question on the application regarding certain criminal convictions within the past five years, the “Question Eight,” Hiatt, on behalf of Jeb Stuart, answered “no.” While it was true that the LLC had not been convicted of any such crime, Hiatt had himself, within that time period, been convicted of insurance fraud. Ultimately the insured property would suffer a fire loss. In investigating the claim, counsel for West American learned of Hiatt’s criminal convictions. On the basis thereof, West American denied the claim. Needless to say, that lead to litigation.
      This decision is focused upon whether Jeb Stuart could recover from West American attorney’s fees expended in successfully challenging the denial of coverage. In the course of this opinion, however, the Court refers to certain prior summary judgment determinations it had made to the effect that, while Hiatt may have been the sole member of Jeb Stuart, Hiatt’s crimes were not attributable to and were not those of Jeb Stuart. Specifically, the Court wrote:
At the summary judgment stage, I held that, by its terms, Question Eight only addressed the “applicant’s” criminal history and that, because Jeb Stuart was a legal entity separate and apart from Hiatt, Hiatt’s answer to Question Eight was correct. As a result, West American wrongfully voided Jeb Stuart’s policy and was liable for the appropriate coverage. (citation to record and footnote omitted).

Monday, June 20, 2016

More on Corporification



More on Corporification

      “Corporification” is the term, invented I believe by Steve Frost, to describe the incorporation (pun intended) into limited liability companies of concepts and principles that have arisen in the context of corporations. Oftentimes the utilization of concepts developed initially in corporate law into an LLC leads to either confusing or unintended consequences as there exist ambiguity as to the degree to which corporate law is intended to be incorporated. A recent case out of Delaware provides a clear illustration of these problems. Obeid v. Hogan, No. 11900-V CL, 2016 BL 185285 (Del. Ch. June 10, 2016).

       This dispute arose out of a pair of limited liability companies, Gemini Equity Partners, LLC and Gemini Real Estate Advisors, LLC. Each of these LLC was owned one third by plaintiff William T. Obeid, one-third by Christopher S. La Mack and one-third by Dante Massaro. Between the two LLCs, they held in excess of 1 billion in real estate assets, including 11 hotels and 22 commercial properties. Prior to the disputes addressed in this litigation, Obeid managed the hotel properties while the La Mack and Massaro managed the commercial properties. The defendant Hogan is a retired federal judge who was retained to serve as the special litigation committee on behalf of each of the LLCs; La Mack and Massaro were not parties to this action. The court throughout referred to Gemini Equity Partners, LLC as the “Corporate LLC” while referring to Gemini Real Estate Advisors, LLC as the "Manager-Managed LLC."
      The Corporate LLC, organized in Delaware, utilized a board of directors comprised of a Obeid, La Mack and Massaro through July, 2014, at which time the La Mack and Massaro removed Obeid. With respect to the Manager-Managed LLC, also organized in Delaware, each of Obeid, La Mack and Massaro served as a manager.
      On July 1, 2014, La Mack and Massaro voted to remove Obeid as the president of the Manager-Managed LLC, installing Massaro in his place. In effect, while Obeid remained a manager, Massaro took on day-to-day control of the Manager-Managed LLC. After a flurry of litigation ranging from North Carolina to federal and state courts in New York, the Corporate LLC and the Manager-Managed LLC, under the control of the La Mack and Massaro, hired the Brewer firm to serve as outside counsel. One of its recommendations was that a retired federal judge be hired to serve as a special litigation counsel to respond to a derivative action filed with respect to each of the LLCs in New York. After a meeting at which no formal resolutions were adopted, the Brewer firm circulated the names of two retired federal judges it had identified as being appropriate to serve as the special litigation committee. Hogan, one of those judges, was ultimately retained pursuant to an engagement letter signed by La Mack and Massaro to serve in that role. Crucially for the outcome of this decision, Hogan was not appointed a director of the Corporate LLC nor appointed a manager of the Manager-Managed LLC. Upon learning that Hogan had been so retained, Obeid filed this action in Delaware seeking a determination that Hogan could not act as special litigation committee on behalf of either LLC or otherwise take any action with respect to the derivative suit. In addition, Obeid sought a declaratory judgment that his removal as a director of the Corporate LLC was invalid.

      With respect to Hogan’s service as the special litigation committee for the Corporate LLC, after setting forth its ultimate conclusion that he could not do so, the court began its analysis with a telling section heading, namely “The Implications Of Mimicking A Corporation's Governance Structure.” From there it observed that LLCs may design their inter-see management structure as they see fit, citing Robert L. Symonds, Jr. & Matthew J. O’Toole, Delaware Limited Liability Companies § 9.01[B] at 9-9 (2015) for the principle that “Virtually any management structure may be implemented through the company’s governing instrument.” From there the Court wrote:
Using the contractual freedom that the LLC Act bestows, the drafters of an LLC agreement can create an LLC with bespoke governance features or design an LLC that mimics the governance features of another familiar type of entity. The choices that the drafters make have consequences. If the drafters have embraced the statutory default rule of a member-managed governance arrangement, which has strong functional and historical ties to the general partnership (albeit with limited liability for the members), the parties should expect the court to draw analogies to partnership law. If the drafters have opted for a single managing member with other generally passive, non-managing members, a structure closely resembling and often used as an alternative to a limited partnership, then the parties should expect a court to draw analogies to limited partnership law. If the drafters have opted for a manager-managed entity, created a board of directors, and adopted other corporate features, then the parties to the agreement should expect a court to draw on analogies to corporate law. Depending on the terms of the agreement, analogies to other legal relationships may also be informative. (citation and footnotes omitted).

      While going on to recognize that there are limitations in drawing analogies between LLCs and other organizational forms, the Court, citing Elf Autochem, 727A.2d at 293, observed that “the derivative suit is a corporate concept grafted onto the limited liability company form.”, leading the conclusion that “absent other convincing considerations, case law governing corporate derivative suits is generally applicable to suits on behalf of an LLC.” (footnote omitted).
      Having determined that the corporate law governing special litigation committees in derivative actions would be applicable to the corporate LLC, the Chancery Court turned its attention to the Zapata Corp. v Maldonado, 43 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) decision.

      After an extensive review of the Zapata decision and the role of the special litigation committee, the Court noted an absence of situations in which the special litigation committee was comprised of non-directors, observing that as derivative litigation does not fall into the ordinary course, these matters would, in the corporate context, need to be resolved by the board. It was observed that:
A board may not make a similarly complete delegation to an officer or a non-director. Doing so would risk an improper abdication of authority. Hence the requirement exists that a Zapata committee be made up of directors.
From there was ultimately concluded:

Judge Hogan is not a director of the Corporate LLC. Consequently, under the Corporate LLC Agreement, he cannot function as a one-man special litigation committee on behalf of the Corporate LLC.
      Turning to the Manager-Managed LLC, even as the Court acknowledged it was not utilizing a board of director management model, it was concluded that the manager-managed system employed was sufficiently analogous to a board structure to justify the application of Zapata and the ultimate determination that Hogan could not, with respect to that LLC, serve as a special litigation committee. “In my view, the resulting structure is sufficient to cause the reasoning that governed the Corporate LLC to apply equally to the Manager-Managed LLC.”
      The court had little problem, applying the operating agreement and the Delaware LLC Act, to find that Obeid's removal as a director was permissible.
      Which brings us back to Corporification. The drafter of the limited liability company agreement for the Corporate LLC wrote into the document significant aspects of the laws of corporate derivative actions. From that utilization, the Chancery Court assumed that the entire body of law governing derivative actions, including that developed exclusively through court decisions, was intended to be applied in the context of this LLC. In effect, the Court read into the express terms of the LLC agreement the common-law penumbra of derivative actions. Whether that is what was actually intended by the drafter is unknown. Were they intending that the common law of derivative actions be incorporated by a deemed incorporation by reference, or rather where they intending that only so much of that law as was set forth in the agreement would apply? Curiously, the Court did not reference the terms of the merger clause of either LLC agreement.
      Regardless, this decision well highlight the perils of utilizing in an LLC agreement principles developed under corporate law. Absent particularly careful drafting, concepts not intended to be applied with respect to that LLC may be found applicable.

Friday, June 17, 2016

More On the Location of LLC Interests and Priority of Charging Orders


More On the Location of LLC Interests and Priority of Charging Orders

      Previously, I reviewed a decision of the Colorado Court of Appeals addressing the priority of various charging orders against the same interest in the LLC as well as the capacity of a court to issue a charging order with respect to the interest in a foreign LLC. That case was McClure v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA., No. 14CA1774 (Co. Ct. App. August 13, 2015). HERE IS THE LINK to my review of that decision.
      On May 31, 2016, the Colorado’s Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari in this case (available at 2016 WL 3180645), agreeing to address the following questions:
(1) Whether the membership interests of a non-Colorado citizen in a Colorado LLC are located in the citizen’s home state or in Colorado for purposes of determining the enforceability of charging orders and lien enforcement.
(2) Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the priority of charging orders issued against the membership interests of a non-Colorado citizen in a Colorado LLC is determined by first in time service of either charging orders issued by Colorado courts or foreign charging orders that have been domesticated in Colorado courts.

Thursday, June 16, 2016

Assignee May Not Move for Dissolution of LLC


Assignee May Not Move for Dissolution of LLC
      In a recent decision from Connecticut, it was affirmed that an Assignee of an interest in an LLC does not have the rights afforded a member to move for its dissolution, winding up and termination. Styslinger v Brewster Park, LLC, 321 Conn. 312 (Conn. Sup. Ct. May 17, 2016).
      This case was succinctly summed up in the first paragraph of the decision, it providing:
In this appeal, we must determine whether the assignee of a membership interest in a Connecticut limited liability company (“LLC”) has standing to seek a court order forcing the winding up of the affairs of an LLC in the absence of the LLC’s  dissolution. We conclude that the Assignee does not have standing to do so.
      Brewster Park, LLC had two members, Michael Weinshel and Joyce Styslinger. In the course of her divorce, Joyce assigned her membership interest in Brewster Park to her husband William Styslinger III with the effect that William would receive the distributions from the LLC while Joyce would remain at member of the company unless and until William was admitted as a member. While William did ask Michael Weinshel that he be admitted as a member, Weinshel had not consented to that happening. William brought suit against both the LLC and Weinshel asserting that Weinshel has breached his fiduciary obligations to the LLC and to William by not making distributions to William while taking distributions for himself, and for refusing to allow William to inspect the LLC’s books and records. William’s prayer for relief included dissolution of the LLC and an appointment of a receiver to wind up its affairs and distribute its assets. Weinshel and the LLC responded, asking that the complaint be dismissed on the basis that an assignee does not have the standing to seek the dissolution of an LLC.
      The trial court agreed that an assignee does not have standing to seek the dissolution of an LLC. Then, on appeal, William made an interesting, but ultimately ineffective, twist in his argument, asserting that, even as he abandoned his efforts to dissolve the LLC, he should be granted standing to seek the winding up and distribution of the LLC’s assets without the LLC undergoing a dissolution.
      Noting that this is a case of statutory interpretation, the court found that, under the Connecticut LLC Act, the winding up of an LLC and the distribution of its assets are integral to dissolution of the entity; there cannot be a winding up absent dissolution. Ultimately it would find:
In the present case, none of the events of dissolution specified in § 34-206 has occurred and the plaintiff therefore cannot trigger a winding up of Brewster Park’s affairs. First, the plaintiff has not alleged that Brewster Park’s articles of organization have triggered a dissolution and it has no operating agreement. Second, the plaintiff has not alleged that its members voted to dissolve. Third, because the plaintiff is not a member of Brewster Park, he cannot pursue a judicial dissolution under § 34-207. Unless and until the plaintiff is admitted to membership, Joyce Styslinger continues to hold the sole power to exercise the rights accompanying her membership interest; see General Statutes §§ 34-170(a)(4) and 34-172(d); and she has not sought a judicial dissolution of Brewster Park in this action. Because no event of dissolution has occurred, and the plaintiff cannot force a judicial dissolution under § 34-207 as an assignee, we conclude that the Act does not grant the plaintiff standing to seek a winding up of Brewster Park’s affairs.
      In a footnote, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s efforts to rely on the general incorporation of “principles of law and equity” into the LLC Act as granting him by the right to move for dissolution. Rather, the court noted that those principles were incorporated only to the extent not displaced by the language of the LLC Act. From there the court noted that, even accepting that equitable principles might otherwise grant an assignee the right to seek a winding up of an LLC, those principles have been displaced by the express terms of the LLC Act.
        The court, in a footnote, distinguished the Delaware opinion in In re Carlisle Etc., LLC, 114 A.3d 592 (Del. Ch. 2015) on the basis of the differing treatments between Connecticut and Delaware law of the assignor. Under Delaware law, the assignor of all of their limited liability company interests ceases to be a member in the company. Under Connecticut law, the assignor (in this case Joyce) remains a member, to the effect that there is not a void in the exercise of rights with respect to the assigned limited liability company interest.