New York Court of Appeals Addresses What is a
Partnership for a
Particular Term or
for a Particular Undertaking
Recently the New York Court of
Appeals, that being the highest appellate state in that jurisdiction, addressed
the assertion that a particular partnership was not one for either a particular
term or for a particular undertaking. Such categorization is an important aspect of
partnership law; while New York retains its enactment of the 1914 Uniform
Partnership Act, and has not adopted the 1997 Revised Uniform Partnership Act,
it is in effect interpreting language that continues to exist in Kentucky’s
adoption of the Uniform Partnership Act.
Further, partnerships for a particular term or for a particular
undertaking continue to exist under RUPA.
Gelman v. Buehler, 2013 N.Y.
slip op. 01991 (N.Y. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2013).
Gelman and Buehler entered into
an oral partnership agreement pursuant to which they would (a) raise capital
with which to identify a potential acquisition target, (b) identify that
target, (c) raise additional funds, (d) acquire the acquisition target, (e)
manage the acquisition target to greater profitability and (f) sell the
acquisition for a profit for both the investors and themselves. However, within months of the creation of
this oral partnership agreement (neither party contested its contents), the
relationship broke down and Buehler announced he was leaving the
partnership. The outcome of the dispute
would turn upon whether the partnership is one either at will or, in the
alternative, for a particular term or for a particular undertaking.
Under partnership law, any
partner may, at any time, withdraw from a partnership at will and in so doing
initiate its dissolution. No damages
flow from a partner so acting. In
contrast, if a partnership is for a particular term or for a particular
undertaking, while each individual partner retains the power to withdraw from
the partnership, damages may be awarded to compensate the partnership for the
consequences of that withdrawal.
At the trial level, Buehler
prevailed in his argument that the partnership was one at will, there being
neither a definite term nor a definite undertaking. That decision was, however, reversed by the
intermediate Court of Appeals which, on a 3-2 vote, determined that the
partnership did have a definite term, running through the expected liquidity
event as to the acquired business.
Further, it found that the partnership was one for a particular
undertaking, namely that of “acquiring a business and expanding it until the
investors would receive a return on their capital investments.”
The Court of Appeals would
agree with the trial court’s decision, overturning the ruling of the Appellate
Division. Citing a number of cases as to
what is a “particular undertaking” including the decision of the Kentucky Court
of Appeals rendered in Fischer v. Fischer,
197 S.W.3d 98 (Ky. 2006), it found that the partnership was not one for a term
in that there had been no agreement as to its duration; a term partnership
requiring some sort of identifiable termination date.
As to the argument that the
partnership was for a particular undertaking, the Court of Appeals determined
that the partnership lacked a “specific objective or project” that may be
accomplished at some future time; its plan for acquisition and resale was “too
amorphous” to satisfy the statutory requirements.
The partnership having,
ultimately, been one at will, no damages flowed from its termination.
A curious point in the
complaint (hat tip to Peter Mahler for posting it on his blog) is that a LLC
(identified as a corporation) was organized in Delaware as, apparently, the
vehicle through which funds would be solicited.
Still, it was asserted that “The LLC was not intended to take the place
of the partnership agreement between the parties.” Complaint ¶ 20. The relationship between the LLC and the partnership
is not further explained in the Complaint, and the LLC is not addressed in the
Court of Appeals’ decision. Was the
partnership the LLC’s member? One of the
plaintiff’s claims was for damages flowing from the potential investors’
decisions to not invest in the LLC. The
alleged damages resulting from the prospective investors withdrawing their
commitments from the LLC gave rise to claims in favor of the LLC and not of
Gelman individually.
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