Upcoming from the Kentucky Supreme Court –
Agent’s Ability to
Bind Principal to Arbitration
In Beverly Enterprises, Inc. v. Ping, the Court of Appeals reversed a
determination by the trial court denying a motion to compel arbitration. Beverly
Enterprises, Inc. v. Ping, No. 2009-CA-001361-MR (Ky. App. July 23, 2010)
(Not To Be Published).
Alma Duncan was admitted to a
long-term nursing facility maintained by Beverly Enterprises. On her mother’s behalf, Ping signed the
nursing facility’s document and as well a separate Alternative Dispute
Resolution Agreement. By its terms, the
agreement provided that it would be governed by and interpreted in accordance
with the Federal Arbitration Act. See id., slip op. at 6, fn. 5. At the time of doing so, Ping presented to
the facility a copy of the General Power of Attorney from her mother. After her mother passed away, Ping, now as
executrix of her mother’s estate, filed a lawsuit against Beverly Enterprises
alleging negligence with respect to her mother’s care. Beverly answered and sought enforcement of
the ADR agreement, which motion was denied by the trial court.
On the basis that the Power of
Attorney did not specifically set forth authority to enter into the ADR
agreement, the trial court found it to be unenforceable. In turn, the Court of Appeals reviewed the
language of the General Power of Attorney held by Ping and determined that its
scope included the ability to enter into the ADR agreement. The Court of Appeals also rejected the trial
court’s determination that there had been fraud in the execution of the
agreement, finding that the agreement to arbitrate was open and obvious, that
no contrary statements had been made as to its legal effect and further that
there was included a right to seek the advice of counsel and the ability to
revoke the agreement within thirty days of its making.
Ping’s brief to the Supreme
Court reasserts each of the bases rejected by the Kentucky Court of Appeals,
beginning with the assertion that the trial court, under the Alley Cat holding, does not have the
ability to compel arbitration. She also
makes the curious argument that, as the healthcare facility stood in a judiciary
relationship with its patient, there was a breach of its fiduciary duties in presenting
the ADR Agreement, it having enticed Ms. Duncan “to waive her constitutional
rights in order to receive medical care.”
Appellant’s Brief to the Kentucky Supreme Court filed August 8, 2011, page
19.
Oral arguments were heard on
February 15, 2012.
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