Friday, November 30, 2018

Charging Orders and Garnishment Limits


Charging Orders and Garnishment Limits

 

In my most recent column in the Journal of Passthrough Entities, I considered whether the various garnishment limits apply to charging orders. Under both federal and state law, as a general proposition, no more than 25% of the “wages” paid an employee may be garnished in order to satisfy a judgment-creditor. This column explores whether those limitations apply with respect to a charging order issued against a member’s distributions from an LLC. There is, perhaps surprisingly, essentially no law directly on point. However, when I look across a range of circumstances, I conclude that the weight of authority is that the garnishment limits do not apply to charging orders.
 
 HERE IS A LINK to that article.

Wednesday, November 28, 2018

Be Careful of Other Rules When Enforcing a Charging Order


Be Careful of Other Rules When Enforcing a Charging Order

      A recent decision from Mississippi is a helpful reminder that, when seeking to enforce a charging order, it is necessary to pay attention to other rules. PNC Bank, National Association v. Walnut Grove Office Gardens, LLC. No. 3:17-MC-17-DMB, 2018 WL 4855212 (N.D. Miss. October 5, 2018).
      PNC had made a series of loans to various LLCs, all personally guaranteed by Walter D. Wills, III. All of the loans went into default. Judgment was entered in favor of PNC against each of the borrower LLCs and Wills in his capacity as guarantor. That happened on September 28, 2017. Then, on October 4, 2017, the court entered an amended judgment. That all happened in the Western District of Tennessee. On November 2, 2017, PNC registered the amended judgment in the Northern District from Mississippi and then, some seven months later, filed an application for a charging order. It was whether that charging order could be issued that is the subject of this decision.
      Under 28 U.S.C. § 1963, a judgment from one court (in this instance, the Western District of Tennessee) may be registered in another court (in this instance, the Northern District of Mississippi) “when the judgment has become final by appeal or expiration of the time for appeal.” Wills never appealed the judgment holding him and the various LLCs liable to PNC Bank. In consequence, the question was whether there had occurred the “expiration of the time for appeal”? As to this point, the court relied upon Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A), which provides that a notice of appeal “must be filed with the district clerk within thirty (30) days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from.” The amended decision in this case was issued on October 4, 2017. It was registered in Mississippi on November 2, 2017. In consequence, less than 30 days had passed from the date of the amended order of the Tennessee court and its registration in Mississippi.
      On that basis, the Mississippi court refused to issue the requested charging order, writing:
Accordingly, the registration was premature and may not form the basis for the enforcement PNC Bank seeks here.
      PNC was granted leave to reregister the amended judgment from the Tennessee court.

Tuesday, November 27, 2018

More from Jay Adkisson on Series; Series in Interstate Commerce


More from Jay Adkisson on Series; Series in Interstate Commerce

 

      Jay Adkisson has in Forbes published a multi-part article on issues involving series.  His latest component addresses the treatment of series across state lines.  HERE IS A LINK to his article.

New Geographic Targeting Order


New Geographic Targeting Order


A new Geographic Targeting Order was released Nov. 15..


The press release and the GTO itself are available here:

·         Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, FinCEN Reissues Real Estate Geographic Targeting Orders and Expands Coverage to 12 Metropolitan Areas (Press Release Nov. 15, 2018), available at https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-reissues-real-estate-geographic-targeting-orders-and-expands-coverage-12

·         Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Geographic Targeting Order Covering TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY (Nov. 15, 2018), available at https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/Real%20Estate%20GTO%20GENERIC_111518_FINAL%20508.pdf


For some additional commentary, see also Samuel Rubenfeld, U.S. Expands Coverage of Real Estate Anti-Money Laundering Program (Wall Street Journal, Nov. 15, 2018), available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-expands-coverage-of-real-estate-anti-money-laundering-program-1542322224

A Few Interesting Points as to Dissolving an LLC


A Few Interesting Points as to Dissolving an LLC
      A recent decision from the Utah Court of Appeals points out a few interesting facts and principles applicable in the dissolution of an LLC. Unfortunately, many of the most interesting points were not preserved for review by the plaintiff, so the Court of Appeals was able to avoid them. Still, the case is interesting reading. Blanch v. Ferrell, 2018 UT App. 172, 2018 WL 4261526 (Utah Ct. App. Sept. 7, 2018).
      Blanch and Ferrell were, with three other brothers, the owners of certain real property in Utah as well as shares in an irrigation company. In 2005 they conveyed all of those assets to an LLC in which each was an equal 20% member. There was no written operating agreement. The articles of organization provided a three year lifespan for the LLC. The LLC expired in 2008, but it was not until 2015 that any efforts were taken to wind up its affairs. At that time, four of the five members adopted a written resolution authorizing the sale of the company’s assets and authorizing the Ferrell to be in charge of that process. Blanch filed this lawsuit, alleging a variety of theories including that the approval of the asset sale required unanimous approval, and he objected. The District Court granted the defendants motion to dismiss, and this appeal followed.
      Initially, the court noted that Blanch had made three arguments with respect to the written consent of the four of the five members authorizing the sale of the LLC’s. He alleged (i) that the consent was a backhanded effort to amend the LLC’s articles of organization, which would be invalid without unanimous approval, (ii) that the written consent was approved without any notice to him, notice being required by the then applicable LLC Act, with the effect that it is invalid and (iii) that two of the four signatories were actually assignees without voting rights. The court, with respect to these arguments, found that none of them had been made below to the District Court and thus could not be raised on appeal.
      Next, Blanch argued that the written consent needed to be unanimous because, with the adoption of Utah’s new LLC Act, acts outside the ordinary course require unanimous approval. Under the predecessor LLC Act, in effect at the time of the adoption of the written consent, actions outside the ordinary course require the approval of two-thirds of the members. In effect, Blanch argued that, with the effectiveness of the new LLC Act, all prior approvals became subject to the new unanimous standard. The Court of Appeals, after having first assessed the written consent under the old law and found it to be effective thereunder, turned its attention to the new law. The court rejected the supposition that the effectiveness of the new law “had the effect of invalidating previous actions taken by a limited liability company.” 2018 UT App 172, ¶ 28.
      Ultimately, Blanch sought a partition of the LLC’s property so that he could retain 20% of it in his own name. Here the court was able to hoist Blanch on the petard of his argument that the new LLC Act is applicable. Under it, in winding up a company, surplus assets must “be paid in money.” Id. at footnote 5, citing Utah Code Ann. § 48-3a-711(4). Applying this provision, the court held, inter alia, that he could not receive hard assets in substitution for money.

Monday, November 26, 2018

More Fun and Games and Charging Orders;If It Is Yours It Can Be Reached With a Charging Order


More Fun and Games and Charging Orders;
If It Is Yours It Can Be Reached With a Charging Order

      A recent decision from Illinois is yet another illustration of the steps that judgment-debtors will undertake in order to avoid satisfying a judgement. In this instance, an individual sought to use a dissolved LLC as, effectively, his personal piggy bank. Golfwood Square LLC v. O’Malley, No. 1-17-2220, 2018 IL App. (1st) 172220-U, 2018 WL 4370875 (Sept. 11, 2018).
      Golfwood Square LLC held a judgment exceeding $900,000 against O’Malley and another individual. O’Malley was the 90% owner of SSG, LLC, which he acknowledged “doesn’t do anything.” In turn, SSG was the sole member of 3 Squared, an LLC that had owned a condo. After judgment had been entered against O’Malley, 3 Square sold the condo, and after satisfaction of the related mortgage retained some $224,000. The operating agreement of 3 Square provided that upon the sale of its assets, the company would be dissolved and, after satisfaction of claims of creditors, the net proceeds would be distributed to the members.
      O’Malley, who admitted that he had “unfettered access” to the account in which those proceeds were deposited, use substantial portions to pay both personal debts and as well the obligations of other companies with which he was affiliated.
      In order to enforce a charging order that had previously been injured, Golfwood sought an order from the court requiring O’Malley to turn over the remaining 3 Square funds.
      In addition to applying several portions of the Illinois law governing supplemental proceedings and collection on judgments, the trial court found that “according to the clear language of 3 Square’s operating agreement, upon selling the Garlands Condo, 3 Square should have dissolved and distributed the sale proceeds to SSG. From there, per the charging order, any distributions that SSG would otherwise have made to O’Malley would instead go to Golfwood. But O’Malley circumvented the charging order by keeping the funds normally under 3 Square’s control while he retained “unfettered access” to the accounts - essentially making a direct distribution to himself in all but name.”
      On that basis, the court of appeals affirmed the turnover order, finding it to be necessary both to enforce the charging order and on otherwise applicable provisions of collection law.
      O’Malley sought to avoid the charging order, by arguing that, in effect, it effected an improper piercing of the veils of each of 3 Square and SSG. This was rejected on the basis that the assets being held (and dispersed from) 3 Square were already O’Malley's.

Sunday, November 25, 2018

Pillars of the Earth & the Sinking of the White Ship


Pillars of the Earth & the Sinking of the White Ship

 

            Pillars of the Earth is in my view an excellent book both for its description of events “from the ground level” of the period of English history known as the Anarchy as well as its treatment of medieval as people just like those of the modern era who are just trying as best they can to make it through each day.
 
            The fulcrum of the macro-political events described in the book is The Anarchy, the contest between the Empress Matilda, daughter of King Henry I (and former spouse of the Holy Roman Emperor, hence her title “Empress”), and Stephen of Blois, Henry’s nephew (just to keep things confusing Stephen’s wife was named Matilda) for the English throne after Henry’s death.  The expected heir to Henry I was his son William.  William, however, drowned on this day in 1120 in the sinking of the White Ship, thereby affording Follett the pivot around which to write Pillars of the Earth.
 
            The Anarchy was resolved by Stephen holding the throne and appointing Matilda’s son Henry his heir.  That Henry would be Henry II, one of England’s great kings.