Thursday, March 25, 2021

Judicial Dissolution of Trio of LLCs Awarded Notwithstanding the Absence of “Deadlock”

 

Judicial Dissolution of Trio of LLCs Awarded Notwithstanding
the Absence of “Deadlock”

In a summer, 2020 decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and awarded judicial dissolution of three LLCs (the trial court had denied judicial dissolution of two of the three) were it was clear that the two equal members could not and would not cooperate with respect to management of the LLCs. Unbridled Holdings, LLC v. Carter, 607 S.W.3d 188 (Ky. App. 2020).

Arvin and Carter were the two members of three LLCs, Southern Tax Services, LLC, Kentucky Property Management, LLC and Unbridled Holdings LLC. Each LLC was member managed, and each had unilateral authority with respect to “the ordinary and day-to-day decisions concerning the business affairs” of the LLC. Through the summer of 2015, Arvin manage the day-to-day operations, when the relationship between the two of them broke down over a personal dispute not otherwise related to either company. Arvin wanted to terminate the relationship embodied in the three LLCs, but the operating agreements of each company require the consent of both members to dissolve. Perhaps not surprisingly in light of the breakdown of the personal relationship between the two of them, Carter would not grant consent to dissolution. In consequence, Arvin brought an action for judicial dissolution of the three LLCs.

Arvin based his claim for judicial dissolution on the assertion that it is no longer “reasonably practicable” for he and Carter to operate the LLCs. In each instance, the purpose provision as set forth in the operating agreements enabled each LLC to engage in “all transactions of any or all lawful business for which limited liability companies may be formed under the laws of the State of Kentucky.” While the trial court ordered the dissolution of Southern Tax Services, judicial dissolution of the two other LLCs was denied, the trial court reasoning that there existed no deadlock because the operating agreement enabled each member, acting unilaterally, to carry on the business and affairs of the LLCs. Arvin appealed, arguing that deadlock is not a precondition to judicial dissolution and that doing so would modify the statutory standard of impracticability into a standard of impossibility.

The appellate court noted that the state legislature did not define “not reasonably practicable” and that there were no published cases in Kentucky interpreting the standard. The court looked to decisions in other states, but noted that there was no one definition or standard. Curiously there was no reference made to Blue Equity Holdings Kentucky, LLC v. Cobalt Riverfront Properties, 2019 WL 4127610 (Ky. App. 2019), wherein the “not reasonably practicable” standard was discussed. The court agreed with Arvin that the statute could not mean that it must be impossible to carry on business – if it did, the legislature would have used the word “impossible” instead of “not reasonably practicable.” It was also noted that decisions in other states generally found the standard to be met by circumstances short of general deadlock, and that the Kentucky legislature must not have meant to require deadlock or, again, it would have used the word deadlock.

“Having extensively surveyed case law from other jurisdictions, we believe the ‘not reasonably practicable’ standard requires the trial court to conduct a multifaceted analysis which takes into account a number of different factors that goes well beyond whether there is a technical deadlock.”

The court referenced Gagne v. Gagne, the Colorado case that first considered the “not reasonably practicable” standard under Colorado law, which also stated that impossibility is not required and then laid out several factors to consider. The factors the court in Gagne identified are:

§  Whether the management of the entity is unable or unwilling reasonably to permit or promote the purposes for which the company was formed;

§  Whether a member or manager has engaged in misconduct ;

§  Whether the members have clearly reached an inability to work with one another to pursue the company’s goals;

§  Whether there is deadlock between the members;

§  Whether the operating agreement provides a means of navigating around any such deadlock;

§  Whether, due to the company’s financial position, there is still a business to operate;

§  Whether continuing the company is financially feasible.

The Unbridled court adopted the multifactor approach, indicating it provided the proper amount of flexibility and discretion to order dissolution even in cases that fall short of deadlock or complete frustration of or total impossibility to carry out the purpose of the company. The court then vacated the trial court’s decision and remanded the case to the lower court to determine, based on a new framework developed by the appellate court, whether the impracticability standard had been met.

 

Wednesday, March 24, 2021

So Ends Gloriana

So Ends Gloriana

      Today marks the anniversary of the death, in 1603, of Queen Elizabeth I of England.  The last of the Tudor monarchs, it was under them, and particularly under Elizabeth, that England moved from being a relative backwater to a European power; her father Henry VIII’s view that England was a power able to shift the European stage by joining with alternatively Spain, France and/or the Holy Roman Empire was not based upon reality (with the Holy Roman Empire and Spain being linked in Charles V, there were two powers in Europe; that combined kingdom and France). Not bad for a family whose claim upon the throne was at best tenuous; the great Tudor historian G.R. Elton described that Tudors as being “a political solution to a dynastic problem.”

      Elizabeth was succeeded by James I (being already James VI of Scotland), the great-grandson of her aunt Elizabeth Tudor who had married James IV of Scotland.

The Limits on What Is and Is Not Practicing Law

The Limits on What Is and Is Not Practicing Law

     A corporation, LLC or other legal entity, with a limited exception for small claims court, may appear in a Kentucky court only through an attorney.  A member or manager who is not an attorney may not argue the LLC’s case, and an officer of a corporation who is not an attorney may not argue the corporation’s case.  A recent decision from the Kentucky Court of Appeals considered what is, inter alia, arguing the corporation’s case.  Cabinet for Health and Family Services v. Appalachian Hospice Care, Inc., No. 2020-C-0684-MR, 2021 WL 407081 (Ky. App. Feb 5, 2021).

        Appalachian Hospice Care was assessed for Medicaid overpayments.  After exchanging information that resulted in a reduction in the alleged overpayment, and in response to an invitation from the Cabinet, Sharon Branham, Appalachian’s President, requested an “Administrative Hearing” as to the matters in dispute; that was on April 12, 2018..  The Cabinet reminded Appalachian that it needed to represented by an attorney at the hearing, and Appalachian hired counsel to do so.  A pre-hearing conference was held on August 1, 2018, in which Appalachian’s attorney participated.  The Administrative Hearing was then scheduled for February 25-27, 2019. But then, on January 15, 2019, the Cabinet:

[F]iled a motion to dismiss.  The Cabinet claimed that a non-lawyer may not request an administrative hearing on behalf of a corporation because it constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. The Cabinet argued that because Ms. Branham, Appellee’s CEO, was not a lawyer, it was unlawful for her to request a hearing. If the hearing request was unlawful, the Cabinet’s jurisdiction had not been timely invoked and the appeal of the alleged overpayment should be dismissed.

Id., *2. Not surprisingly Appalachian disagreed, but the hearing officer and then the Cabinet dismissed the overpayment appeal on the basis that the request for the hearing was not properly made, i.e., through an attorney.  On Appalachian’s appeal to the Franklin Circuit Court those determinations were rejected. 

On October 21, 2019, … the Franklin Circuit Court reversed the final order entered by the Secretary. The court held that simply requesting a hearing was not the practice of law, and it was proper for Appellee’s CEO to request the hearing. The court also held that the Cabinet should be estopped from seeking dismissal because it did not inform Appellee an attorney was required to request a hearing. The court also noted that it had presided over appeals of Medicaid decisions in the past and took judicial notice that the Cabinet had never before taken the position that an attorney for a corporation must be the one to request a hearing. This appeal followed. 

Id. Affirming the Franklin Circuit Court, the Court of Appeals reviewed and distinguished the authorities relied upon by the Cabinet in its argument that requesting a hearing is the practice of law. Rather:

After examining the above cases and KBA opinion, as well as the definition for the practice of law, we conclude that Appellee’s CEO was not engaged in the practice of law when she requested a hearing. Writing and sending the letter did not require any special legal knowledge and did not give out any legal advice. Any adult with the ability to read and write could have requested a hearing. The request did not need to be in any special format, other than to be in writing, or be written on a specific form. The request was not sent to a court of law and was not required to follow the rules of civil procedure. The Cabinet informed Appellee that all it needed to do to request a hearing was to send a letter to specific Cabinet departments. It then freely gave the necessary mailing addresses to Appellee. Sending this request required no special skill; therefore, it cannot be considered the practice of law.

Id., *5.

Tuesday, March 23, 2021

An LLC’s Member May Not Bring Suit on the Franchise Agreement In Which the LLC Was the Franchisee

 An LLC’s Member May Not Bring Suit on the Franchise Agreement In Which the LLC Was the Franchisee

It is axiomatic that an LLC and its member(s) are legally separate and distinct from one another.  In this 2021 decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals this rule was applied when the sole member of an LLC sought to on her own name bring suit on a franchise agreement into which her LLC had entered.  Mouanda v. Jani-King International, No. 2019-CA-1594-MR, 2021 WL 406317 (Ky. App. Feb. 5, 2021).

            Constance Mouanda was the sole member of The Matsoumou’s LLC (the “Company”).  The Company entered into a franchise agreement for the Jani-King system from Cardinal Franchising, Inc. (“Cardinal”), a master-franchisee, in February, 2018.  In 2019 she brought suit alleging she was fraudulently induced to enter into the franchise agreement, asserting as well that the structure was used to improperly deprive her of classification as an employee without the benefit of minimum wage.  Cardinal responded with a motion to dismiss:

It argued that she lacked standing to bring this cause of action because the franchise agreement was between Cardinal as the franchisor and The Matsoumou’s, LLC as the franchisee. Mouanda, individually, did not have a contractual relationship with Cardinal and therefore could not bring suit against it. In addition, Cardinal asserted that Mouanda was an independent contractor performing work for her LLC. Therefore, she was not an employee, and Cardinal was not her employer. Cardinal also argued that Mouanda failed to plead her fraud claim with particularity. In the accompanying memorandum, Cardinal pointed out that the LLC had been incorporated on November 11, 2017, well before the franchise agreement was signed. The franchise agreement contained provisions in which Mouanda acknowledged that she was an independent contractor and that no employment taxes would be withheld by Cardinal.

Id., *3.  The complaint was dismissed without prejudice for lack of standing.

            Affirming the trial court and adopting its application of Andrew v. Turner, 413 S.W.3d 272 (Ky. 2013), the Court of Appeals held she lacked standing to bring the suit:

The proper plaintiff for this complaint should have been The Matsoumou’s, LLC, the named franchisee in the franchise agreement with Cardinal.

Id., *6.

Monday, March 22, 2021

More on LLCs and Their Members are Separate and Distinct

 

More on LLCs and Their Members are Separate and Distinct

            In this 2021 decision the Kentucky Court of Appeals was focused upon whether Cabinet for Health and Family Services has the authority to issue an enforceable subpoena to a person not resident in Kentucky.  In the course of answering “no” the court addressed the distinction between an LLC and its members.  Brightmore Home Care of Kentucky LLC v. Cabinet for Health and Family Services, No. 2019-CA-1409-MR, 2021 WL 222729 (Ky. App. Jan. 22, 2021).

            In connection with a certificate of need hearing, the Cabinet issued subpoenas to the two members of Brightside, it being the applicant.  Those subpoenas were served on Brightside’s registered agent. Finding the Cabinet did not have authority to issue to subpoenas, the court as well noted that the service through the LLC’s registered agent was ineffective.

“Finally, serving a subpoena on an LLC, or its agent, is not the same as serving a subpoena on a member of that LLC.  LLCs and their members are separate and distinct entities.”, citing Turner v. Andrew, 413 S.W.3d 272 (Ky. 2013).

Friday, March 19, 2021

Personal Liability of Corporate Officers for Black Lung Benefits Affirmed Even as Veil of Insurer Not Pierced

 

Personal Liability of Corporate Officers for Black Lung Benefits
 Affirmed Even as Veil of Insurer Not Pierced

      In a March, 2021, decision from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, the court addressed the personal liability of corporate officers for black lung benefits. With respect to the mine operator, it was held that the officers of the mining company are personally liable thereon. In contrast, its insurer, which had not paid on the policy, would not be pierced to hold the officers of the insurer personally liable upon the claim. Templeton v. Apollo Fuels, Inc., No. 6:19-CV-71-REW, 2021 WL 920982 (E.D. Ky. March 10, 2021).

      Templeton had been granted an award of black lung benefits, including a lump sum for past benefits owed and attorneys’ fees. Neither Debra Lynn Coal, Inc. (“DLC”) nor Apollo Fuels, Inc. (“AFI”) satisfied the claim (AFI was the insurer), and this case arose.

      Applying the Black Lung Benefits Act (the “BLBA”), notwithstanding having purchased insurance thereon, the court noted that the obligation to make payments under the BLBA is on the operator, and the acquisition of insurance thereon does not absolve it of that ultimate responsibility. From there, the BLBA, its § 933(d)(1), “assesses personal liability on certain corporate officers if the employer required to secure benefits fails to do so.” quoting Donovan v. McKee, 669F. Supp. 138, 139 (S.D. W. Va. 1987), aff’d, 845 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1988). This liability extends to the president, the secretary and the treasurer of the operator. Based upon that authority, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion to hold each of the president and the secretary/treasurer of DLC liable for the benefits due and owing.

       Conversely, the court would not hold the president of AFI, the insurer, personally liable on the amounts due and owing. While § 933(d)(1) may have impose liability upon the operator’s officers, there existed no statutory equivalent with respect to an insurer. The court as well observed “A court should be reluctant to pierce the corporate veil absent a clear directive.”

IRS and Kentucky Shift Individual Income Tax Return Deadlines from April 15 to May 17

 

IRS and Kentucky Shift Individual Income Tax Return Deadlines from April 15 to May 17

 

        On Wednesday of this week the Internal Revenue Service announced that the deadline for submission of individual tax returns would be delayed from April 15 to May 17. HERE IS A LINK  to the announcement.

     On Thursday the Kentucky Revenue Department followed suit and delayed the Kentucky income tax return from April 15 to May 17.  HERE IS A LINK to that announcement.

     As of now we await word from the Indiana Department of Revenue as to whether they will be following the IRS’ lead.