Wednesday, May 15, 2019

Dissenter Rights Procedure


Dissenter Rights Procedure

      In Peter Mahler’s blog New York Business Divorce, Franklin C. McRoberts has posted a summary of the requirements applicable, under New York corporation law, for the prosecution of a dissenter rights action. Why your state may not follow the exact same procedure, this posting provides a useful outline of what you need to look for under the laws of other jurisdictions.
      That posting, entitled How to Initiate a Fair Value Appraisal Proceeding as a Dissenter’s Checklist, is available at the following link: HERE IS A LINK.

Monday, May 13, 2019

Business Law Update: Cases (and a Few Statutes) of Which You Need To Be Aware


Business Law Update: Cases (and a Few Statutes) of Which You Need To Be Aware

     On Thursday, June 13, at the KBA Annual Convention, the KBA Section of Business Law will be presenting Business Law Update: Cases (and a Few Statutes) of Which You Need to be Aware.
      This Business Law Update is designed to bring attendees up to speed on the most important cases handed down by Kentucky and other courts over the last two years. The developments being reviewed are important for both the business law practitioner and the business law litigator. While there will not be time to review every case in the voluminous outline, presenters Elizabeth M. Reeder and Thomas E. Rutledge will highlight particular decisions. In addition, their presentation will address a number of cases that have come down after the due date for the outline.
      This presentation will be from 3:45 through 4:45 in the French Room.
 
 

Thursday, May 9, 2019

Business Organizations Must Be Represented By Attorneys In Unemployment Compensation Hearings


Business Organizations Must Be Represented By Attorneys
In Unemployment Compensation Hearings

      In a recent decision from Kentucky Court of Appeals, it struck down as unconstitutional a  statute allowing business organizations (corporations, partnerships, LLCs, etc.) to appear at hearings on unemployment compensation through persons who are not attorneys. Rather, it was held that the employer must be represented by an attorney. Nichols v. Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission, No. 2017-CA-001156-MR, 2019 WL 1868589 (Ky. Ap. April 26, 2019).
       In this dispute, Norton Healthcare, the employer of Nichols, appeared before an Unemployment Insurance Commission hearing through Skinner, the Director of Clinical Engineering at Norton (and not an attorney). Nicholsapplication for unemployment benefits was denied. Before the Court of Appeals the question was whether that determination was valid because of the employer’s representation by a non-attorney. Ultimately, the denial of benefit would be struck down because of Norton’s improper representation by a non-attorney.
      There was a statute, KRS § 341.470(3), that permitted a partnership or corporate employer to appear through non-lawyers at unemployment hearings. In this ruling, the Court of Appeals would strike down that statute is unconstitutional, finding that:
The statutory provision allowing corporate or partnership employers to appear pro se through non-lawyer representatives in unemployment proceedings, violates the separation-of-powers provisions of the Kentucky Constitution. Since Norton was represented by a non-attorney in the administrative proceedings before the Commission, we must vacate the circuit court’s order with directions to remand this matter to the Commission for a new administrative hearing.
      This decision is consistent with other rulings of the Kentucky Supreme Court with respect to representation by a non-attorney of a business organization. Applying that prior law, this panel of the Kentucky Court of Appeals wrote:
However, in Turner v. Kentucky Bar Association, 980 S.W.2d 560 (Ky. 1998), our Supreme Court held that a similar statute authorizing non-attorneys to represent and advise workers’ compensation claimants encroached on the exclusive power of the judiciary to establish rules relating to the practice of law. Id. at 562-63. See also KY. CONST. § 116. “Legal representation by a lay person before an adjudicatory tribunal, however informal, ... as such representation involves advocacy that would constitute the practice of law.” Turner, 980 S.W.2d at 564. Furthermore, the Court expressly declined to extend comity to the statute at issue in Turner. Id. at 563.
 
We emphasize that individual employers, such as a sole proprietorship, have the right to represent themselves in any administrative or legal proceeding. We also recognize that KRS 341.470(3) has a laudable goal of trying to simplify proceedings before the Commission. However, it is well-established that representation of a corporate or non-natural entity by a non-attorney implicates the unauthorized practice of law. See SCR 3.020. See also Statewide Environmental Services, Inc. v. Fifth Third Bank, 352 S.W.3d 927, 929 n.4 (Ky. App. 2011). Based on Turner, we are compelled to conclude that this restriction also applies to proceedings before administrative agencies. Therefore, to the extent that KRS 341.470(3) provides otherwise, the statute violates the separation-of-powers provisions of the Kentucky Constitution.

Wednesday, May 8, 2019

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Addresses Distinction Between Traditional and Business Trusts for Purposes of Diversity Jurisdiction


Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Addresses Distinction Between Traditional and Business Trusts for Purposes of Diversity Jurisdiction

      In a decision rendered earlier this month by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, it addressed whether a particular trust would be treated as a traditional trust or a business trust for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. In this instance, having examined the documents that brought the trust into existence, it was determined that it would be treated as a traditional trust. Demarest v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., ___ F.3d___, No. 17-56432, 2019 WL 1510430 (9th Cir. April 8, 2019).
      Demarest brought this action in state court challenging the foreclosure of her property. HSBC, as the trustee of the deed of trust holding as assignee the mortgage, along with other defendants, removed the action to federal court, where they were granted summary judgment. In this appeal, Demarest sought a determination that the removal of the action to federal court was deficient. She would lose that argument.
      While the law in this area has noteworthy exceptions, the generally accepted rule is that, with respect to a traditional trust, its citizenship, for purposes of determining whether or not there exists federal diversity jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1332) will be that of the trustees (i.e., the citizenship of the beneficiaries as beneficiaries will not be attributed to the trust). In contrast, a “business trust,” a category that includes a variety of business organizations that, while utilizing “trust” in their respective names, do not share the elements of a traditional trust, will be assessed like any other unincorporated organization and the citizenship of all of the members (i.e., the trust’s beneficiaries) will be attributed to the trust. In this instance the plaintiff was alleging that, as HSBC had not demonstrated that none of the beneficiaries of the trust were California citizens, the removal of the action failed.
      The plaintiff’s position was based upon the US Supreme Court's decision in Americold, wherein it clarified the law with respect to traditional trust versus unincorporated business organizations; HERE IS A LINK to my review of the Americold decision. Also HERE IS A LINK to my review of two subsequent decisions applying the holding in Americold. The plaintiffs reliance on Americold was rejected on the basis that the trust here at issue for which HSBC served as the trustee was a traditional common law trust and not a business trust as contemplated by the Americold ruling. As observed by the court:
Among other things, the Agreement established the Trust, enumerated its assets, and appointed HSBC as trustee, and it described the Trust as a common-law trust governed by New York law. Id.
      In addition, the trust afforded the trustee, in that capacity, the power to institute a “suit or proceeding in its own name as Trustee.” Id. *6. Based upon these characteristics, it was determined that the trust at issue is a common-law trust subject to the rule of Navarro Savings Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458 (1980), under which only the citizenship of the trustees, and not the citizenship of the beneficiaries, would apply in determining citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.

Tuesday, May 7, 2019

Swearing In the Newest Members of the Papal Swiss Guard


Swearing In the Newest Members of the Papal Swiss Guard
 

        Yesterday, on the anniversary of the Sack of Rome in 1527 by troops of Charles V,  Holy Roman Emperor, twenty-three new members of the Papal Swiss Guard were sworn into service.
 

        Since the late 15th Century Italy (or at least the region we today identify as Italy – the notion of the region as a nation was long in the future) had been repeatedly invaded by forces from Northern Europe, each seeking to claim dominion over one area or another. Rival claimants to the crown of Naples caused as much trouble as did anything, but economic rivalry between for example Genoa and Venice did nothing to calm the waters.  Pope Alexander VI gave command of the papal army to his son/nephew (which is a matter of dispute) Cesare in order to bring some order, and Pope Julius II would actually don armor and lead his army into battle, again in an effort to bring some stability to the situation.  While Erasmus would condemn Julius for doing so, he did ignore the fact that the targeted cities surrendered to him.

 
        But back to the Sack of Rome.  Charles’ forces were at this point battling the League of Cognac, it being comprised of France, Milan, Venice, Florence and the Papal States.  Keeping track of the various Leagues through the Italian Wars is a troubling task; the League of Cambrai was initially formed against Venice by the Papacy, France, Spain and the Holy Roman Empire. Later the initial members would be allied against France with Venice as an ally. In the next permutation Venice and France would be against the Papacy, Spain and the Holy Roman Empire. After a significant victory over the French army Charles’ troops were restive in that they had not been paid – most were mercenary. Pillaging Rome would be a way of paying the troops. The city was not well defended, although its formidable walls did need to be and were breached.  Their commander having fallen in the course of the attack, discipline immediately broke down among the troops, and a sack of over three days began.

 
        The Pontifical Swiss Guard, created only in 1506 under Pope Julius II, rose to the occasion. Of its then number of 189, 147 would fall defending Pope Clement VII, affording him time to take refuge in the Castel Sant’Angelo (Hadrian’s Mausoleum). In recognition of this event, new members of the Pontifical Swiss Guard are sworn in on May 6. 


           There was in 2013 an event unique to the Guard, namely the recognition of a Pope’s retirement. Benedict XVI left the Vatican as Pope, flying to the Castle Gandolfo. The Swiss Guard accompanied him to the castle and there stood guard. When the moment his resignation became effective, and Benedict became not Pope but Pope Emeritus, the Guards left their station at the castle and returned to Rome. While the Vatican has its security forces, and they no doubt continued to provide protection for Benedict, the Swiss Guard serve the Pope.

Monday, May 6, 2019

You Cannot Sue Somebody For Not Doing What They Never Agreed To Do


You Cannot Sue Somebody For Not Doing What They Never Agreed To Do

      In a recent decision from the Delaware Court of Chancery, the court considered and rejected a variety of claims brought by a member of an LLC. One of those claims was that the managers of the LLC never sent to the plaintiff certain company books and records. The problem with this aspect of the suit was that the manager never undertook that responsibility. Ross v. Institutional Longevity Assets LLC, Civ. Act. No. 2017-0186-TMR, 2019 WL 960212 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2019).
      The plaintiff, Ross, brought suit against a number of parties who were members in Institutional Pooled Benefits LLC (“IPB”). It is important that at this juncture in the litigation IPB was no longer a defendant. Rather, as matters were here proceeding, Ross asserted that members Institutional Longevity Assets, LLC (“ILA”) and MRB Pooled Benefits, LLC (“MRB”), as well as certain of their individual constituents, violated certain duties arising out of the operating agreement.
      Ross brought a claim couched as breach of contract for failure to send to him certain financial statements. The problem with this complaint was that none of the defendants had undertaken the obligation to provide to Ross those financial statements. Rather, as the Chancery Court would note, “The terms of the Operating Agreement unambiguously refer to IPB as the responsible party, not the Defendants.” 2019 WL 960212, *4.
      On that basis, the claim was dismissed as a matter of law.

Wednesday, May 1, 2019

More on Relationships that are Not Fiduciary


More on Relationships that are Not Fiduciary

 

      In a recent decision from a federal district court in Iowa, it held that certain relationships are not fiduciary in nature.  Meardon v. Register, 3:18-cv-00042, 2018 WL 7858345 (S.D. Iowa Dec. 18, 2018).
 
      Responding to the suggestion that a fiduciary relationship arose out of a long-term business relationship gave rise to a fiduciary duty, the court wrote “Business relationships alone are not fiduciary relationships; nor are friendships.” Id, *7.