Tuesday, July 26, 2016

Treasury Department Proposes to Impose Additional Tax Reporting Obligation on Foreign Owned LLCs


Treasury Department Proposes to Impose Additional Tax Reporting Obligation on Foreign Owned LLCs

       The Treasury Department, on May 5, 2016, proposed regulations that would increase the reporting and record maintenance requirements of US organized disregarded entities (typically single member LLCs) owned by foreign persons.
      In support of the objective of receiving additional information with respect to these foreign-owned disregarded entities, the Treasury began with a definitional sleight-of-hand; a domestic disregarded entity that is wholly owned by a foreign entity or person will be treated as if it is a domestic corporation. As a corporation, the disregarded entity will be treated as separate from its owner for the purpose of all reporting, record maintenance and other compliance requirements that are already apply with respect to domestic corporations that are owned 25% or more by foreign entities or persons. The proposed regulations require that, each foreign-owned disregarded entity (“FODE”):
·         file a Form SS4 with the IRS, thereby obtaining a Federal Tax Identification Number and as well identifying to the IRS who is a “responsible party” with respect to the FODE;
·         file, on behalf of the FODE, IRS Form 5472, Information Return of a 25% Foreign-Owned U.S. Corporation or a Foreign Corporation Engaged in U.S. Trade or Business setting forth, irrespective of whether they are subject to federal income tax, reportable transactions between the FODE and its foreign owners or foreign related parties; and
·         maintain records sufficient to establish the accuracy of any Form 5472 and in the US tax treatment of those transactions.

      If finalized, and there is little reason to think they will not be, these regulations will constitute a significant change with respect to the treatment of FODE’s. Currently, most FODE s do not file a Form SS-4 and are not subject to either tax reporting or record maintenance obligations under the Internal Revenue Code. These proposed regulations would affect a 180° change in that treatment. Further, as the IRS would have new information with respect to the US activities of FODE’s, the IRS may share that information with foreign tax authorities pursuant to various information sharing agreements to which the US is a party.
      HERE IS A LINK to the proposed regulations as published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin.

Friday, July 22, 2016

Finally, Some Clear Direction On Diversion Of Business Opportunity: Patmon v. Hobbs III


Finally, Some Clear Direction On Diversion Of Business Opportunity:
Patmon v. Hobbs III

Last Friday, the Kentucky Court of Appeals issued its third decision in the Patmon v. Hobbs, No. 2014-CA-001411-MR, 2016 WL 3886831 (Ky. App. July 15, 2016). This third opinion acknowledges certain of the errors made in Patmon v. Hobbs I, clarifies the measure of damages upon the diversion of an opportunity and perhaps most importantly adopts a strict test as to the defense that a venture was financially unable to act upon the opportunity. In doing so, the Court of Appeal cited the article I wrote with Professor (now Dean) Tom Geu on Patmon I, namely The Analytic Protocol for the Duty of Loyalty Under the Prototype LLC Act, 63 Arkansas Law Review 473 (2010).


      Grossly oversimplifying the dispute, Hobbs, purporting to act as the managing member of an LLC, unilaterally transferred for no consideration certain contract rights and other assets of the LLC. Hobbs was a co-owner of that transferee company. Patmon, another member of the original LLC, brought an action charging Hobbs with having breached his fiduciary duties to the LLC. In the first Patmon v. Hobbs decision, Patmon v. Hobbs, 280 S.W.3d 589 (Ky. App. 2009), it was ultimately held that he might have done so, but that Patmon would have the burden, on remand, showing that the LLC could have performed on the transferred contracts. While the ultimate conclusion that Hobbs was bound by fiduciary obligations was (and is) normatively correct, the analytic path used in the decision was hopelessly flawed. Those errors were reviewed in the Analytic Protocol article; HERE IS ALINK to that article. The decision has as well been parsed, including against subsequent amendments to the LLC Act, via its annotation; HERE IS A LINK to that annotation (see Exhibit 7.7.2). Also, since Patmon I was decided, the LLC Act has been amended to cut off further misinterpretation of the Act as to both the statutory definition of the fiduciary duties in LLCs and the availability of a “fairness” defense to the appropriation of company assets. See KRS §§ 275.170(1), (2), as amended by 2010 Ky. Acts, ch. 133, § 32 (expressing labeling the various provisions is the duty of care and the duty of loyalty owed in LLCs); KRS 275.170(2) as amended by 2012 Ky. Acts, ch. 81, § 106.

      After remand and another appeal, the Court of Appeals considered the further actions of the trial court.  See Patmon v. Hobbs, 2014 WL 97464 (Ky. App. Jan. 10, 2014.) inding that the trial court did not resolve necessary issues, the Court of Appeals criticized the measure of damages it had employed. HERE IS A LINK to my review of that decision.

      After that remand and another appeal, now this case comes to the Court of Appeals for a third time. Cutting to the chase, it continues to be unhappy with the work done by the trial court, and the case has for the third time been remanded.
      The first substantive portion of the opinion calls the trial court to task for not providing, as it had been previously directed to do so, specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. On that basis the reversal and remand was granted. Slip op. at 11. “Nevertheless, we find it helpful to further explain the trial court’s on remand as described in Patmon I. Id.
      From there, the Court of Appeals (Judges Dixon, Lambert and Thompson) first addressed who had the burden of proof on the question whether the LLC had the financial wherewithal to perform on the leases that had been transferred. Hobbs had defended on the basis that the LLC could not perform, so it was in effect deprived of nothing by the transfer of the leases. “Hobbs defended his actions opining that American Leasing did not have the financial ability to take advantage of the O’Reilly.” Slip op. at 4. Patmon asserted that the burden should be upon Hobbs to prove the absence of the ability to perform, while Hobbs responded that Patmon I had allocated that burden to Patmon and that under the “law-of-the-case” that allocation could not be revisited. Over several pages the Court all but said that this allocation of the burden should have been upon Hobbs, but under the law-of-the-case rule it must in this case be as set forth in Patmon I. “There is some appealing logic to the reasoning that the inability of the Corporation (sic - this case involves an LLC) to undertake the diverted opportunity as an affirmative defense to be proven by the defendant.” (slip op. at 14), but:

[W]e agree with Hobbs that the law-of-the-case doctrine applies to the holding in Patmon I that Patmon had some burden to demonstrate that American Leasing had the financial ability to take advantage of the O’Reilly leases to prevail under the doctrine of diversion of business opportunity.
Although we must apply the legal principles pronounced in Patmon I to the facts as stated in that opinion, the law-of-the-case doctrine applies only to the extent that an issue was actually resolved….  Although Patmon I placed the burden of proof on Patmon on remand to demonstrate American Leasing had the financial ability to perform the O’Reilly leases, Patmon I did not address the proof necessary to meet that burden. We now do so. Slip op. at 14.

      The Court would require that Patmon demonstrate (presumably in further disputes this burden will be upon the defendant) that the LLC was able to utilize the opportunities. Crucially, at this juncture the Court would also define what is the standard for insolvency such that it will release a fiduciary from the charge of having diverted an opportunity.

       The Court began by reviewing foreign law to the effect that only actual insolvency as a defense to the diversion of what is otherwise a company opportunity. Slip op. at 14-15. Quoting Klinicki v. Lundgren, 678 P.2d 1250 at 1253-54 (Or. App. 1984), the Patmon III Court wrote:
To allow a corporate fiduciary to take advantage of a business opportunity when the fiduciary determines the corporation to be unable to avail itself of it would create the worst sort of temptation for the fiduciary to rationalize an inaccurate and self-serving assessment of the corporation’s financial ability and thereby compromise the duty of loyalty to the corporation if a corporate fiduciary’s duty of loyalty conflicts with his personal interest, the latter must give way. Unless a corporation is technically or de facto insolvent, a determination whether a business opportunity is corporate or personal does not depend on the corporation’s relative financial ability to undertake the opportunity. Slip op. at 15.

It went on to state:
We hold that unless American Leasing was insolvent or legally prevented from performing the O’Reilly leases, Hobbs must compensate it for his diversion of the O’Reilly leases. The trial court is instructed to make the requisite finding. Slip op. at 16-17 (emphasis added).

      The Court then turned to how damages are to be measured. Previously the trial court had in effect awarded Patmon a percentage interest in the net proceeds realized by Hobbs from the disposition of the leases transferred from the LLC. That measure was rejected. Rather, first Hobbs is liable to the LLC for the full measure of the benefits and the gains generated from the use of those assets. “KRS 275.170 requires that Hobbs completely disgorged himself of any benefits received.” Slip op. at 18. Those benefits are to go to the LLC, rather than directly to Patmon. Further, “in addition to statutory damages, if the trial court finds on remand the American Leasing is not financially insolvent, the measure of damages is the lost profits the corporation (sic - LLC) would have received had the opportunity not been diverted.” Slip op. at 18-19. The Court noted as well that pre-judgment interest may be in order. Slip op. at 19.
      Then, returning to Patmon I and Patmon II, the LLC is to be dissolved, and in the course thereof the trial court may reset the sharing ratios between the members. Slip op. at 9.

This decision is important for a variety of reasons including:
·         Recognition of the separation of LLCs from the common law of corporations and partnerships (Slip op. at 13);
·         Recognition of the prior error in the allocation of the burden of demonstrating inability to perform, strongly hinting that in the future the burden is upon the person alleging the inability to perform;
·         Defining actual insolvency as the threshold for an inability to perform;
·         Giving teeth to the statutory directive that, in the event of the diversion of company assets from an LLC, the person effecting the diversion is obligated to remit to the LLC all gains and benefits derived therefrom;
·         Specifying, on remand, that the trial court is not to accept the price at which Hobbs ultimately transferred the LLCs assets, but rather to independently determine their fair market value;
·         Affirmation of the rule that, upon dissolution of the LLC, sharing ratios may be reset in order to, on an equitable basis, account for Hobbs’ a breach of duty; and
·         Raising, with respect to the award of damages to the LLC, the possibility of an award of prejudgment interest.
      For myself, I have been far from reticent in criticizing the decision rendered in Patmon I. This Patmon III decision goes a long way to bringing Kentucky’s law on fiduciary duties in LLCs into compliance with the LLC Act and more generally principles of fiduciary duty law.

Kill Them All, God Will Know His Own


Kill Them All, God Will Know His Own

     Today is the anniversary of the Massacre at Béziers, an event that took place in 1209 during the Albigensian Crusade. Whether, however, “Kill them all, God will know his own” was actually uttered is open to debate.
      The Albigensian Crusade was launched early in the 13th century in response to the rise of the Cathar heresy in southern France. The Crusader army, not as coherent as it should have been, entered the territories in which Catharism was strong, encountering Béziers as the first significant town. Efforts to negotiate a settlement were unsuccessful, and the army began preparations for mounting a siege. Almost inadvertently, a skirmish broke out between some of the irregular troops with the Crusader army and town residents. Ultimately, that mob was able to push into the town through open gates, whereupon a general sack began. Although many of the citizens of Béziers sought to take refuge in various churches in the town, they were all broken into, and nearly all the residents were put to the sword. When discord later broke out between the regular troops of the Crusader army and the irregular troops who had successfully broken into the town, it was put to the torch.  In response to the sack and the execution of the town’s residents, when asked what should be done to separate the orthodox from the heretics, Arnaud Amalric, the Abbot of Citeaux and the Papal Legate traveling with the army is reputed to have said words to the effect of “Kill them all, God will know his own.”
      Amalric filed a letter with the Pope describing what had happened. It does not report the line quoted above. Rather, the line arises from a story told some 20 years later by Caesarius. He was not, however, present at Béziers.  Hence, whether the now famous line, “Kill them all, God will know his own.” was there said is open to question.

Which Partnership Law?


Which Partnership Law?

      In a recent and otherwise not very interesting (at least from my perspective) decision out of the Kentucky Court of Appeals, it seems there was confusion as to which partnership law controls. Carlotta v. Reed, No. 2013-CA-001567-MR (Ky. App. July 15, 2016).
       This dispute involved the winding up and termination of a limited liability partnership, Mark & Barry Foods, LLP, which had as its constituent partners Mark G. Carlotta and Barry G. Reed. Most of the opinion deals with the effect in the litigation of failures by Carlotta to produce documents in discovery, failures which were strongly held against him in the trial on the merits.
 
       That aside, the court seemed to be confused as to which statute would apply. For example, on the first page of the slip opinion, it recited that KRS § 362.345 was being applied in the “partnership dissolution and allocating the parties respective partnership interests.” That statutory reference is to the Kentucky Uniform Partnership Act, originally adopted in 1954. However, later in the opinion (page 10 of the slip opinion), both KRS §§ 362.1-806 and 362.1-807 are cited in connection with Carlotta’s challenge to “the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court set’s final judgment as concerns the division of partnership assets and contends that his filings did not comply with KRS 362.1-806 and KRS 362.1-807, which govern the settlement of liabilities and accounts upon the dissolution of the partnership.” Of course, both KRS §§ 362.1-806 and 362.1-807 are from the Kentucky Revised Uniform Partnership Act (2006).
      Ultimately, it may not matter which statute applied as they will largely yield the same results. However, both cannot apply to the same partnership.

Thursday, July 21, 2016

It's Not Me, It's You: Planning for Expulsion of Members from LLCs


It's Not Me, It's You: Planning for Expulsion of Members from LLCs

 

       I have recently published in the Journal of Passthrough Entities this article, It's Not Me, It's You: Planning for Expulsion of Members from LLCs.  The thrust of the article is the need to consider expulsion of a member when writing operating agreements and the consequences of failing to do so.

       HERE IS A LINK to the article.

Tuesday, July 19, 2016

No Claim for Breach of Duty Against Court Appointed Receiver


No Claim for Breach of Duty Against Court Appointed Receiver

      In a decision rendered last Friday by the Kentucky Court of Appeals it was held, inter alia, that the owners of a business undergoing dissolution have no claim for breach of fiduciary duty against a court-appointed receiver. Rather, the receiver is an officer of the court and is covered by quasi-judicial immunity. Farmer v Miller, No. 2014-CA-000330-MR (Ky. App. July 15, 2016).
      John Farmer and Dennis Boehm had been the co-owners of a company named Bluegrass Recovery & Towing, LLC. The company was subject to a series of both financial difficulties and disagreements between Farmer and Boehm, leading to several pieces of litigation between them. At one juncture, Farmer and Boehm agreed to the appointment of a receiver, Stephen Miller. Miller was charged to “work with the parties to liquidate the business,”, and both Farmer and Boehm were charged to “cooperate with Mr. Miller so that he can appropriately perform his work.” Slip op. at 4. But then:
Pursuant to the directives of the trial court, Miller took control of the remaining assets of Bluegrass and attempted to assist the parties in finalizing dissolution and liquidation. However, the parties continue to quarrel and did not cooperate with Miller's efforts. Miller ultimately liquidated all of the assets of Bluegrass except the real property encumbered by the National City Bank mortgage. Id.
       After additional litigation, including in connection with the bank's foreclosure on the real property, Farmer filed this lawsuit against Miller alleging negligence, breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract. Slip op. at 6. Filed against Miller in his individual capacity rather than in his role as the court-appointed receiver:
The Complaint alleged Miller had acted outside the scope of his court-order duties as receiver for Bluegrass, resulting in substantial negative financial implications for Farmer. Specifically, Farmer alleged Miller failed to make regular mortgage payments to National City Bank, real property taxes, insurance and property maintenance expenses although he had sufficient Bluegrass assets from which to do so. Farmer contended these actions resulted in foreclosure, imposition of tax liens, seizure of his personal funds, and reduction in value of the real property. Slip op. at 7.
      In response, Miller filed a motion to dismiss on the basis of quasi-judicial immunity. Farmer responded by asserting that the actions of which he complained were ministerial in nature, and that no immunity should attach for the negligent performance thereof.
      The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, treating it as a motion for summary judgment, and this appeal followed.
       Adopting the reasoning of the trial court, the Court of Appeals found that Miller, as a court-appointed receiver, was entitled to quasi-judicial community. The court held that a receiver is obligated to do only those things that the court has directed them to do, and that efforts such as that of Farmer to impose additional duties, if enforced, “would result in sanctioning an inappropriate expansion of Miller’s duties beyond the trial court’s explicit directives.” Slip op. at 12.

Monday, July 18, 2016

Early Applications of the Americold Decision on Diversity Jurisdiction



 
 
Early Applications of the Americold Decision on Diversity Jurisdiction

      There have already been two published decisions by federal courts applying the Supreme Court’s ruling of earlier this year in Americold Realty Trust v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012 (2016). Therein, the Supreme Court made clear that, where a trust has the capacity to sue and be sued in its own name, the rule of Carden v. Arkoma, and not the rule of Navarro Savings Association, will be applied to determine the citizenship, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, of a trust. HERE IS A LINK to my earlier review of the Americold decision. It is also discussed in an article from the Journal of Passthrough Entities; HERE IS A LINK to that article.  Specifically, in RTP LLC v. ORIX Real Estate Capital, Inc., Nos. 14-3671 & 15-1153, 2016 WL 3568090 (7th Cir. July 1, 2016), Americold was held to apply to certain pension fund members of the plaintiff to the effect that they would be treated as members whose citizenship must be determined. In the second case, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Transcontinental Realty Investors, Inc., No. 3:14-cv-3565-BN, 2016 WL 357-0648 (N.D. Texas July 1, 2016), Americold was applied with respect to a securitization trust that was deemed the real party in interest.

       In RTP LLC v. ORIX Real Estate Capital, ORIX had made a loan of some $41,000,000  to RTP for the purchase of buying a commercial building in North Carolina. While that loan was itself nonrecourse, RTP LLC and an entity now named RSCD Opportunity Fund I, LLC but previously named Inheritance Capital Group, LLC, executed conditional guarantees with respect thereto. Ultimately the loan went into default, at which time ORIX accelerated the obligation and demanded that RTP and inheritance satisfy their respective guarantees. While it appears they asserted the guarantees were invalid or in some other basis ineffective (the opinion does not address this point beyond a statement that they sought “a declaration that they do not owe ORIX anything beyond what can be paid out of the building’s assets.”), the trial court would hold them liable to the tune of $30,000,000. This action before the District Court had been brought on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.
      It was on the basis of diversity jurisdiction that the action would be largely set aside. RSCD Opportunity Fund I, LLC, identified in the opinion under former name Inheritance Capital Group, LLC, has the citizenship of its members. That LLC had as its members two retirement plans, namely the General Retirement System of the City of Detroit and the Police and Fire Retirement System of the City of Detroit; each is organized as a trust with the capacity to sue and be sued in its own name. In reliance upon, inter alia, Navarro Savings  v. Lee, ORIX claimed that diversity jurisdiction should be assessed by looking only to the citizenship of the trustees of each of those trusts, ignoring, for purposes of citizenship, the citizenship of the beneficiaries of those trusts.

      In reviewing the matter, the Seventh Circuit would first hold that two decisions, May Department Stores Co. v. Federal Insurance Co., 305 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2002) and Hicklin Engineering, L.C. v. Bartel, 439 F.3d 346 (7th Cir., 2006) “did not survive Americold.” From there, it was observed that “the trusts themselves, not the trustees, are the members of the two LLCs. Detroit’s two pension funds contract (and litigate) in their own names. These trusts therefore have the citizenships of their own members.” The court would also note that the members of a trust of this nature include not only current participants who are paying into the trust fund, but also current beneficiaries thereof. Ultimately, in order to demonstrate diversity jurisdiction, ORIX, the party who sought removal in the first place, is going to need to investigate the domicile of each of the trusts that are in turn members of one of the guarantor parties. Specifically:
ORIX may think it pointless to conduct a detailed inquiry into the domiciles of the 59 persons who resided in these two states in 2013, especially because it would become necessary to consider the possibility that beneficiaries who then resided elsewhere (say, Oklahoma or Maryland) were domiciliaries of Texas or Delaware at the time. But ORIX may choose its own litigation strategy.
      Ultimately, the judgment of the District Court was vacated, the case was remanded for further proceedings. It was specified that if ORIX does not seek to determine the domicile of those trust beneficiaries as of 2013, “then the District Court must remand this litigation to state court.”

      The second of these decisions, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Transcontinental Realty Investors, Inc., involved the treatment of a securitization trust. Wells Fargo filed this action initially in federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. In doing so, Wells Fargo identified only its own citizenship, namely South Dakota, as the basis for diversity; Transcontinental is a Nevada corporation with its principal place of business in Texas. Transcontinental sought dismissal of the action on the basis that diversity did not exist. As summarized by the court:
Wells Fargo is the trustee of the Trust, and an unincorporated entity, and the Defendant argues that Wells Fargo cannot rely solely on its own citizenship for diversity jurisdiction. Instead, Defendant alleges, Wells Fargo must establish the diverse citizenship of all of the Trust’s members to establish diversity jurisdiction.
      As any award of relief would be to the benefit of the trust, and not Wells Fargo alone, it was found that “a careful review of the complaint makes clear that Wells Fargo is only a nominal or formal party suing on behalf of the trust, which is the real and substantial party to the controversy with Defendant.”
      Without parsing the particular characteristics of the trust at issue, the court would hold, inter alia, that it is not a traditional, donative trust, but rather a trust for which the citizenship of all of the beneficiaries would be attributed for determining citizenship.
Here, unlike a human trustee suing in her own name on her own behalf as in Navarro, the Trust is the plaintiff and real party in interest, and, as an unincorporated entity, the Trust is a citizen of the states in which its members are located. Because Wells Fargo has not established the citizenship of each of the Trust’s members, Wells Fargo has failed to properly invoke federal diversity jurisdiction.
 
 

On that basis, Transcontinental’s motion to dismiss was granted and the action was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.