Wednesday, June 15, 2016

The Mythology of Magna Carta


The Mythology of Magna Carta

 

      Last year there are being held a series of events commemorating the 800th anniversary of the Magna Carta, the “Great Charter” imposed on “Bad” King John in 1215; that makes today the 801st anniversary (yeah, that just does not sound as good)  of its signing.  Last year’s events included a display of the Magna Carta at the Kentucky State Fair, a presentation supported by both the Kentucky Bar Association and the Louisville Bar Association.


      June 15 is celebrated for the signing of Magna Carta by King John and his leading nobles, all at Runnymede.  From there the foundation of Magna Carta is espoused as a foundational document in the development of the rule of law.  The only problem is that the Magna Carta of June, 1215 was a dead letter.  John repudiated the charter, and that repudiation was affirmed by Pope Innocent III.


      John's after-the-fact rejection of Magna Carta precipitated the First Barons War, a contest in which a group of disaffected nobles actually aligned themselves with the King of France. Had history turned out only slightly differently, the Angevin house of England could have been replaced by the French royal house, thereby uniting England and France under a single crown.  That, of course, was the ultimate aim of the English in the Hundred Years War in the 14th and 15th centuries, but that is a different story.  Still, the First Barons War was a close call, and John could easily have lost.  King John would die in October, 1216, the Crown being inherited by his nine year old son Henry III.  As part of the effort to bring the First Barons War to a conclusion, William Marshal, the prototypical knight of the period and the Regent of Henry III, caused there to be issued a shorter version of Magna Carta. This effort was not entirely successful, but the shorter version was ultimately incorporated into the settlement the brought about the resolution of the First Barons War.


      Henry III would again issue Magna Carta during his reign as a trade-off for new taxes, and his son Edward I would as well issue Magna Carta in his own name.  Subsequent monarchs would do the same through the 14th century.


      That said, none of the issuances of Magna Carta, irrespective of a specific content, had the same theatrical flair as the June 15, 1215 signing at Runnymede.  For that reason, it remains the event to which everybody refers.
 

      But it did not bring Magna Carta into law. 


      In other anniversaries, today is without question the date of issuance, in 1520, of the bull Exsurge Domine by Pope Leo X.  Addressed to formerly obscure theology professor Martin Luther, it threatened excommunication if Luther did not recant certain heretical views. He did not do so, and the threatened excommunication was carried out in January 1520.  Whereas the 1215 Magna Carta never had legal effect, Exsurge Domine did and does.

Wednesday, June 8, 2016

Another Hog Gets Slaughtered: Delaware Bankruptcy Court Invalidates Lender's Efforts to Preclude Debtor's Bankruptcy


Another Hog Gets Slaughtered: Delaware Bankruptcy Court Invalidates Lender's Efforts to Preclude Debtor's Bankruptcy

      In a decision rendered on June 3, 2016, the United States Bankruptcy Court for Delaware invalidated certain requirements requested by a lender that had the effect of rendering its debtor incapable of filing bankruptcy. In re: Intervention Energy Holdings, LLC, Case No. 16-11247 (KJC) (Bankr. De. June 3, 2016).
      Intervention Energy Holdings, LLC and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Intervention Energy, LLC were jointly indebted to EIG Energy Fund X V-A, L.P. EIG had purchased senior secured notes issued by Intervention; those notes were secured by various liens. Over time, various amendments have been made to the relevant note purchase agreements, including with respect to certain coverage covenants. Certain of those coverage covenants were ultimately violated. Those violations led to Intervention and EIG entering into a Forbearance Agreement and Contingent Waiver (the “Forbearance Agreement”) pursuant to which, assuming EIG would raise $30 million of equity capital to pay down the secured notes, the coverage violations would be waived. However, as a condition to the effectiveness of that Forbearance Agreement, EIG required Intervention to amend its operating agreements to provide:

·         that a single unit would be issued to EIG, making it a member in Intervention; and

·         requiring the unanimous approval of the members before any filing for bankruptcy could take place.

      Ultimately Intervention would file for bankruptcy protection notwithstanding that it did not have the consent of EIG to it doing so. That led to a motion to dismiss, brought by a EIG against Intervention, on the basis that Intervention lacked the authority to file for bankruptcy protection. In its decision, the Bankruptcy Court would reject that motion to dismiss. As such, the bankruptcy will proceed.
      EIG, in support of its motion to dismiss, argued that, under the LLC Act, there is essentially full freedom of contract, including to set the requisite threshold for filing a petition in bankruptcy. intervention relied upon the fact that a waiver of the capacity to file for bankruptcy is invalid and as well the recent decision rendered in In re Lake Michigan Beach Pottawatamie Resorts LLC in which a bankruptcy remote structure relying upon a “independent director” who lacked fiduciary duties was held to be unenforceable.

      Obviously the arguments of Intervention would prevail.  After string citing numerous decisions rejecting the notion that the right to file bankruptcy can be waived by contract, including a decision from the United States Supreme Court, it was observed:
A provision in a limited liability company governance documents obtained by contract, the sole purpose and effect of which is to place into the hands of a single, minority equity holder the ultimate authority to eviscerate the right of that entity to seek federal bankruptcy relief, and the nature and substance of whose primary relationship with the debtor is that of creditor - not equity holder – and which owes no duty to anyone but itself in connection with an LLC’s decision to seek federal bankruptcy relief, is tantamount to an absolute waiver of that right, and, even if arguably permitted by state law, is void as contrary to federal public policy.  Slip op. at 9 (citations omitted).
      From there, in light of the factual background of the mechanism by which EIG acquired its single interest in Intervention and the amendment of the LLC agreement requiring unanimity in order to file bankruptcy, it found those to be “the unequivocal intention of EIG to reserve for itself the decision of whether the LLC should seek federal bankruptcy relief.” Following the other federal bankruptcy courts, it was the determination of the Intervention court that it would not enforce a waiver of the right to seek bankruptcy protection and, from there, it concluded that Intervention had the necessary authority to commence its Chapter 11 proceeding.
      Decisions such as this as well as the In re Lake Michigan Resort decision (HERE IS A LINK to my review of that decision) identify outlier structures that will not be enforced with respect to bankruptcy remoteness. They do not stand for the proposition that bankruptcy remoteness is itself either improper or unattainable. The proper structuring of these relationships can be achieved, but that structuring should begin at the beginning of the debtor/creditor relationship.

Tuesday, May 24, 2016

“I Use Series LLCs to Save on Filing Fees” and Other Really Silly Things People Have Said


“I Use Series LLCs to Save on Filing Fees” and Other Really Silly Things People Have Said

      The series LLC is a highly complicated organizational form that, conceptually, allows the segregation of debts and obligations within a series thereof, protecting the LLC and any other series from liability thereon. Series are not available under the Kentucky LLC Act, but they are available under the Kentucky Statutory Trust Act. With respect to the series provisions of the Kentucky Statutory Trust Act, see Rutledge, The Kentucky Uniform Statutory Trust Act (2012): A Review, 40 Northern Kentucky Law Review 93 (2012-13); HERE IS A LINK to that article. With respect to the structuring of series organizations and the myriad questions that are not yet resolved as to this organizational form, see, for example, Rutledge The Man Who Tells You He Understands Series Will Lie To You About Other Things As Well, 16 J. Passthrough Entities 53 (March/April 2013) (HERE IS A LINK to that article) and Rutledge Again, For the Want of a Theory: The Challenge of the “Series” to Business Organization Law, 46 American Business Law Journal 311 (2009) (HERE IS A LINK to that article).

      It has been asserted by some that they use series, which typically do not require their own state filing and filing fee, in place of single-member LLCs, which do require a state filing and filing fee. Having recently given the issues some additional thought from the perspective of the requirements to maintain the liability shield between series, that explanation simply fails.
      Under the various series acts, in order to achieve limited liability between the series and as well between each individual series and the LLC itself, property must be “associated” with either the correct series or the LLC. The “association” of property can be a time intensive issue, requiring that the relationship of the series and the property be reflected on the books and records of the LLC. Essentially, every time it is intended that a series receive property, that property must be associated with the series.
      Consider an LLC that has 12 pieces of rental property, each of which is associated with an individual series. Each month, the tenants pay on their leases in the amount of $2000 per tenant. All else being equal, where Property A is associated with Series One, the $2000 received on that lease needs to be associated with Series One; if that association does not take place then those funds are available to satisfy claims against any of the other Series Two through Twelve or to satisfy an obligation of the LLC. That has to be done every month for each payment made to each series; we now have 144 bookkeeping entries to be accomplished each year.

      Now, let's assume that, with respect to Property C that is associated with Series Three, in March the washing machine goes out. The LLC calls its usual handyman, who runs over to the local big box home improvement center, picks up a replacement dishwasher that is charged to the LLCs account, and installs it in Property C. For the reasons recited above, that dishwasher now needs to be associated with Series C or it is available to satisfy claims against the other series. The same happens when, in October, the water heater in Property L, which property is already associated with Series Twelve, fails and needs to be replaced.
       Mind you, if each of these properties were in a single-member LLC wholly-owned by a master LLC, association would not be a problem. Rather, for example, when the tenant of Property A pays on the lease, even to a common payment agent, those funds are the property of the SMLLC A without the need for further action.
      So let's get back to avoiding filing fee. Assume that in any particular state in which LLCs are allowed to set up series, there is no filing fee to set up a series but there is a $100 filing fee for each LLC. In the series structure outlined above, only $100 in filing fees would need to be paid. If, conversely, the were a master LLC with 12 SMLLCs underneath, each holding one property, $1300 in filing fees would have to be paid. If that differential of $1200 is not spent each year as the additional cost in associating property to each of the various series, that association is probably not being done properly.

      Furthermore, had a string of single-member LLCs, rather than series, been used in this structure, there would have been no risk of assets not being associated in order to achieve asset partitioning. Rather, it would have happened simply by virtue of the LLC Act.
      Combine the de minimus nature of filing fees against the incurred cost of association of property with the uncertainty that exist as to secured financing, bankruptcy, veil piercing, etc., and I submit that the claimed reduction in filing fees dwarfed by additional costs incurred and legal uncertainty undertaken.

The Judgment of Paris


The Judgment of Paris

 

       For those of you who from time to time enjoy a good wine, today is the anniversary of the Judgment of Paris, the competition in 1976 between the then still young California wine industry and the venerable French vintages.  The competition was sponsored by a seller of French wines and was intended to reinforce their position as the dominant vintners.

      It did not turn out so well.  Overall the California wines (including one of my favorites Stag’s Leap) prevailed.  Some of the judges (they were all French) tried to recover their score cards.

George Tabor wrote a book about the competition that includes background information of some of the wineries involved and the (generally dismal) history of wine production in the US after Prohibition. Since then the story has changed.

 

 

Sunday, May 22, 2016

Arizona Charging Order Held Subject to Garnishment Limits


Arizona Charging Order Held Subject to Garnishment Limits

 

       Applying Arizona law, it has been held that a charging order is limited by the 25% threshold applied as to wage garnishments.  United States of America v. Alexander, No. CR-05-00472-001-PHX-DGC, 2016 WL 2893406 (D. Ariz. May 18, 2016).


      Alexander, the sole member of an LLC, owned millions of dollars in restitution (the opinion does not address that nature of those claims.  In order to collect on that debt, the government sought a charging order against the distributions made to Alexander by his single-member LLC.  Alexander responded that the charging order could not attach to more than 25% of the distributions, an argument accepted by the court:

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But the charging order is limited to the garnishment permitted by Arizona law. The fact that a charging order is entered, however, “does not deprive any member of the benefit of any exemption laws applicable to his interest in the limited liability company.” A.R.S. § 29-655(B). Arizona law limits garnishment to 25 percent of a garnishee’s disposable earnings. A.R.S. § 33-1131(B). “Earnings” are defined broadly to include “compensation paid or payable for personal services, whether these payments are called wages, salary, commission, bonus or otherwise.” A.R.S. § 12-1598(4). “Disposable earnings” is defined as the “amount remaining from the gross earnings for a pay period after the deductions required by state and federal law.” A.R.S. § 12-1598(3). As the sole member of E-Logic, Defendant receives distributions equivalent to the LLC’s annual income. These are provided as compensation for his personal services to E-Logic. These distributions qualify as earnings and are protected by the personal property exemption. The charging order therefore cannot deprive Defendant of more than 25 percent of his disposable earnings. (footnote omitted).
 

            Although no Kentucky court has yet addressed the question, likely this result would not happen in Kentucky.

Friday, May 20, 2016

A Pair of “Recent” Decisions on Successor Liability


A Pair of “Recent” Decisions on Successor Liability
      A pair of recent (well, relatively recent) decisions remind us that successors may be liable for unassumed obligations of their predecessors. Pontacolini v. Dailybreak/CP, LLC, 2016 Mass. Super. LEXIS 24 (March 21, 2016) and Louro v. Pedroso, 2015 WL 3495330 (Super. Ct. N.J. June 4, 2015), review denied December 15, 2015.
      When two companies merge or consolidate, the company surviving the transaction is liable for all debts and obligations of each party to the transaction. In contrast, in a purchase/sale of assets, the general rule is that the purchaser is liable only for the seller obligations it assumed in the purchase/sale agreement; liabilities not assumed by the buyer remain those of the seller, and need to be satisfied out of the seller’s assets. Of course, those assets include the consideration received for the assets that were sold.
       That is all well and good if the seller has sufficient assets to satisfy the retained liabilities. But what happens when that is not the case? The law has developed “successor liability” principles that determine whether the purchaser can be held responsible for those unassumed liabilities.
      The Pontacolini decision arose out of the application for summary judgment filed by Dailybreak/CP, LLC seeking a determination that, as it had not assumed the liabilities of Dailybreak, Inc. to Nicholas Pontacolini, it was not liable thereon. That motion for summary judgment would be denied.
       In June, 2013, Nicholas Pontacolini became an employee of Dailybreak, Inc., serving as the regional sales director. His compensation was a combination of salary and commission.  Within four months, however, that relationship broke down, and by October 7, 2013, Pontacolini was no longer employed by Dailybreak, Inc. Thereafter discussions took place with the resolution of claims for earned but unpaid commissions. After making an application to the Attorney General's Fair Labor Division, Pontacolini was given a right to pursue an action against Dailybreak, Inc.
      In the meantime, however, on September 4, 2014, Dailybreak, Inc. and Dailybreak/CP, LLC entered into an asset purchase agreement pursuant to which the corporation sold all of its assets to the LLC for $175,000 plus certain earn-out rights. The LLC agreed to assume certain liabilities of Dailybreak, Inc. and entered into certain covenants, including the funding of an operating deficit, the subleasing the corporation’s office space, and that all employees of the corporation would be terminated by the corporation but then immediately rehired at the same compensation by the LLC. Pontacolini would bring his action for unpaid commissions against the LLC, asserting it to be the successor-in-interest to the corporation.
      While Massachusetts follows the generally applicable law that the purchaser of assets is not liable for unassumed debts and obligations of the seller, it does what it characterizes as a “de facto merger” analysis for imposing liabilities on a successor, looking to:
1) whether there is a continuation of the enterprise of the seller corporation so that there is continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets, and general business operation; 2) whether there is a continuity of shareholders which results from the purchasing corporation paying for the acquired assets with shares of its own stock, this stock ultimately coming to be held by the shareholders of the seller corporation so that they become a constituent part of the purchasing corporation; 3) whether the seller corporation ceases its ordinary business operations, liquidates, and dissolves as soon as legally and practically possible; and 4) whether the purchasing corporation assumes those obligations of the seller ordinarily necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of normal business operations of the seller corporation. Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles, LLC, 451 Mass. 547, 557, 887 N.E.2d 244 (2008).
      While Dailybreak/CP LLC would rely upon the express terms of the asset purchase agreement, “alleging that the Agreement has immunized itself from liability as against Mr. Pontacolini's claim.”, the court found it to be insufficient. Rather, applying the factors of the Milliken decision, the court found that Dailybreak/CP, LLC could be found to be the successor-in-interest of Dailybreak, Inc. Therefore, the claim for the unpaid commissions could proceed forward.
      The Louro v. Pedroso decision involves a business transaction far less sophisticated than that considered in the Pontacolini case.
      Pedroso, an attorney, was the sole shareholder of Pedroso Law Firm, P.C. That professional corporation was the tenant of certain property located on Jefferson Street in Newark New Jersey. After Victor and Jennifer Louro acquired that property following a foreclosure and sheriff sale, they brought an action to expel Pedroso and his firm from the property, and as well sought to be compensated for unpaid rent for the use of that property. Before the damages were determined, the court issued an ejection order from the Jefferson Street premises. Undisclosed to anybody, Pedroso established a new LLC, Pedroso Legal Services, LLC, and in its name relocated his practice to Wilson Avenue in Newark.
      At trial, it was alleged that Pedroso, on behalf of Armando Pena, the prior owner of the property and a relative of Pedroso, prepared a pair of leases. One lease provided for a monthly rate of $2500, while the other provided for monthly lease payments the amount of $425. There was testimony that the second lease, at the $425 rate, was prepared once it became clear that the building was going into foreclosure and was allegedly put in place in an effort to defraud any subsequent purchaser.
      Ultimately, the jury would award damages at the rate of $1500 per month for 14 months of uncompensated occupancy of the Jefferson Street property. After trial, the plaintiff submitted a judgment in that amount, as well as interest and cost, seeking that it be issued against both the Pedroso Law Firm “and any subsequent law firm created by Felipe Pedroso.” Pedroso disputed that the judgment could be entered against anyone other than Pedroso Law Firm, P.C. (the entity he had already abandoned). The trial court determined that Pedroso’s new LLC would be included as a named defendant against whom the judgment would be entered.
      Pedrosa challenged that determination on appeal, all to naught. Rather, the judgment against the LLC would be affirmed.
      In the face of incomplete and evasive answers from Pedroso as to when he had organized the LLC and why he had done so, the trial court “concluded that the LLC is simply the new name of Pedroso’s law firm, which has continued in business.” In addition, focusing upon the fact that this case involved a law firm, the Appellate Division wrote:
Here, Pedroso believes he can evade the payment of a judgment for rent arrears on the office space his law firm occupied simply because he has decided to “rejuvenate” and to change the “image” of his firm under a new name and at a different location. The legal profession is not so disdainful of the rights of creditors that it would allow Rules 1:21-1A and -1B to be thus misused by a member of the New Jersey Bar. The Rules of Professional Conduct for lawyers in this State do require general honesty. See RPC 8.4(c).
Ultimately:
Here, Judge Dumont found that the LLC is merely a continuation of the law firm under its prior corporate identity. Pedroso’s license to practice law in this State was used in conducting the business of the prior law firm just as it is now used to conduct the business of the successor LLC. Appellant offered no credible evidence that the LLC is not a continuation of the law practice of the prior firm.
      A few take-aways.  First, sequentially organizing business organizations for the purpose and effect of avoiding liabilities will not work.  Not considered in either of these decisions, but always a factor, is whether doing so will give rise to liability under fraudulent conveyance statutes.  Second, asset buyers, seeking to limit their exposure for seller obligations, should ascertain the manner in which the seller will satisfy, and as necessary compromise, those obligations from the sale proceeds or other assets.  Leaving the seller unable to satisfy its obligations invites a claim against the buyer.