Monday, September 21, 2015

Single-Member LLCs Are Not So Simple


Single-Member LLCs Are Not So Simple

      Last Thursday, Kelley Bender, Bob Keatinge and I presented a two hour seminar at the ABA BLS Annual Meeting on single-member LLCs.  All too often, SMLLCs are treated as being very simple.  Without too much effort (actually we had more materials than we could deliver in the available time), we came up with two hours of discussion of situations and circumstances in which the expected outcome of the SMLLC might not be what is expected.

 

Our Lady of Perpetual Exemption and Securities Fraud


Our Lady of Perpetual Exemption and Securities Fraud

      No doubt by now you have heard of the already discontinued the church founded by comedian John Oliver, Our Lady of Perpetual Exemption.
      It occurred to me, in listening to the skit and the quotations from numerous of the “prosperity gospel” ministers upon which it was based (and whom it lampoons), that in the context of securities regulation there would be a prima facie case for securities fraud. 
      Just a thought.

Monday, September 14, 2015

Court of Appeals Holds that Self-Defense is Not an Exception from Employment At Will


Court of Appeals Holds that Self-Defense is Not an Exception from
Employment At Will

      Under Kentucky law, absent a contract to the contrary, the employer/employee relationship is “at will”; either party may terminate the agreement any time. As characterized by one court, the relationship may be terminated “for a good cause, for no cause, or for a cause that some might view as morally indefensible.” Wymer v. J. H. Properties, Inc., 50 S.W.3d 195, 198 (Ky. 2001).  There are, however, a few narrow exceptions to this rule, typically to the effect that an employee may not be terminated for engaging in certain protected activities such as filing a claim for worker’s compensation or engaging in union organizing activities.
      In this case, the Court of Appeals considered, and rejected, the suggestion that an employee's exercise of the admitted right of self-defense does not constitute an exception to the rule of employment at will. Smith v Norton Healthcare, Inc., No. 2014-CA-000352-MR (Ky. App. Sept. 11, 2015).
      Smith was an employee of Norton Healthcare where he worked as an environmental services supervisor. On May 23, 2012, when dropped off to work near the Norton facility, he was attacked by a hotdog vendor who both insulted and struck him on the face. As reported by the Court of Appeals, “After Smith took up a defensive posture, he became entangled with the vendor but never hit him. Norton security officers broke up the altercation and reported the incident to the Norton.” A week later, on May 30, Norton terminated Smith, citing a violation of its workplace violence policy. Smith claimed wrongful termination on the basis that it violated Kentucky's public policy of the right of self-defense as set forth in both the Kentucky Constitution § 1 and KRS § 503.050(1).
      Still, the court required that the right at issue have “an employment related nexus”, citing Grzyb v Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399, 402 (Ky. 1985). As formulated by the court there “may not be a sufficient nexus if the statute was not designed to protect the employee from the specified harm that resulted.” The court held that (i) Ky. Const. § 1 does not apply to private, as contrasted with state, actors and (ii) the right of self-defense set forth in KRS § 503.050(1) was not designed or intended to relate to termination of an employment relationship.
      For that reason, the trial court's dismissal of Smith's complaint for failure to state a cause of action (CR 12.02(f)) was affirmed.

Saturday, September 12, 2015

Athenian Forces Defeat Invading Persians at Marathon


Athenian Forces Defeat Invading Persians at Marathon
 

      Today might be the anniversary of the great battle, fought in 490 at Marathon, at which the forces of Athens defeated the Persian invasion sent by Darius the Great. The exact date of the battle is subject to controversy, although there is something of an alternative consensus on the 21st.

 
      At the time of the battle, the Persian Empire extended from the western boundaries of what is today India across the Middle East, Turkey and to Southwest Europe.  Darius had decided that the land we refer to today as Greece, inhabited by a variety of city-states, would be next incorporated into his empire.  An invasion fleet landed its troops some 26 miles northeast of Athens at the Bay of Marathon.  Working with collaborators in Athens, it was thought that the army could be drawn away and destroyed even as the collaborators led an internal revolt, taking control of the city and making it available to Darius.  It would not turn out that way.


      At news of the landing, Athens sent word to Sparta seeking its assistance, the Spartan hoplite troops being the strongest force in the region.  Famously, the Spartans were unwilling to send their forces in light of an upcoming religious festival. In consequence, Athens would stand alone.  The Athenian army, well smaller than the Persian forces, camped facing their enemy for over a week.  On the 8th day, seeing that the Persians were re-embarking some troops onto ships and fearing that they intended to launch a direct assault on Athens, the Greek forces attacked.  Although outnumbered, by skillful flanking maneuvers the Greeks were able to envelop the Persian forces.  While the historical records recite what must be grossly inflated figures, certainly the Persians lost in excess of 6,000 men while the Greeks lost fewer than 200. 


Although not recounted in the contemporary historic record, a runner took off to announce the victory to Athens.  Just over 26 miles later, he entered the city, announced “nickomen” (“victory”) and dropped dead from exhaustion.  Meanwhile, the balance of the Persian army embarked on their ships and set out from the Bay of Marathon with the intent of directly attacking Athens.  The Athenian army force-marched itself back to the city, manning its walls as the Persian fleet approached.  The Persians decided that another attack was not in their best interest and they withdrew.


     A decade later, the Persian forces under Xerces, son of Darius, would again invade Greece.  They would ultimately fall victim to the Spartan and allied forces at Thermopylae, the Greek naval forces at Salamis and again the allied forces at Plataea.

Thursday, September 10, 2015

Diversity Jurisdiction and Jurisdictional Discovery: The Third Circuit Holds That “Hiding The Ball” Will Not Work


Diversity Jurisdiction and Jurisdictional Discovery: The Third Circuit Holds That “Hiding The Ball” Will Not Work
      Federal diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, requires that the dispute both involve more than $75,000 and that there be complete diversity, i.e., that no defendant be a citizen of any state of which a plaintiff is a citizen. While corporations, consequent to specific legislative designation, are deemed to be citizens of the jurisdiction of incorporation and the jurisdiction in which is located the corporation’s principal place of business, an unincorporated association such as a partnership, limited partnership or LLC is deemed to be a citizen in which any of its partners/members are citizens to the effect that, for example, if a member of an LLC is itself another LLC or a partnership, citizenship must be tracked through all layers until there are reached either natural persons or corporations. A plaintiff bringing an action in federal court, or a defendant seeking to remove an action to federal court, is required to plead facts demonstrating that diversity exists. This obligation can be at best difficult to satisfy when one considers that the membership of partnerships and LLCs is almost never of public record. How then, can either the plaintiff or the defendant seeking to enlist diversity jurisdiction adequately plead its existence?
      This dilemma was recently faced and addressed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. In this case, the plaintiff brought an action in federal court against defendants including LLCs. Those defendants moved to dismiss the action on the basis that diversity jurisdiction had not been adequately pled.  Of course, the information as to the membership of those defendant LLCs was uniquely within their control. As such, the plaintiff had pled diversity jurisdiction on the basis of “information and belief.” Ultimately, the Third Circuit would confirm that “information and belief” pleading is at least initially sufficient. Lincoln Benefit Life Company v. AEI Life, LLC, No. 14-2660, 2015 WL 5131423, ___ F.2d__ (3rd Cir. Sept. 2, 2015).

      Lincoln Benefit brought suit in order to have declared void two life insurance policies, alleging they were procured by fraud or for the benefit of third-party investors (i.e., “Stranger Originated Life Insurance” or “STOLI”). AEI Life, LLC and ALS Capital Ventures, LLC were identified as the record owners and beneficiaries of those two policies. In its Complaint, originally filed in New Jersey, Lincoln Benefit alleged that it is a citizen of Nebraska based upon its organization and principal place of business. It alleged, “upon information and belief,” that AEI Life, LLC and ALS Capital Ventures, LLC were citizens of, respectively, New York and Delaware. In response:
The defendants filed motions to dismiss for, among other things, lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Their primary argument was that Lincoln Benefit failed to adequately plead diversity jurisdiction: an LLC’s citizenship is determined by the citizenship of its members, and Lincoln Benefit had not alleged the citizenship of the members of the LLC defendants.

      Lincoln Benefit, in response, pointed out that none of the defendants had asserted that it was a citizen of Nebraska and further that, as information as to the membership of an LLC is not publicly available, it should be allowed to proceed on a “information and belief” basis or, in the alternative, it should be afforded the opportunity to undertake limited discovery for the purposes of confirming that diversity did exist. The trial court held against Lincoln Benefit, holding (a) that pleading diversity on the basis of information and belief is insufficient and (b) that allowing jurisdictional discovery would be inappropriate when it was not clear that the federal court did not already have jurisdiction. It was from these determinations that Lincoln Benefit appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

      The Third Circuit, after providing a brief review of the rules of diversity jurisdiction, noted that there are two bases for challenging jurisdiction. First, there is a “facial attack,” which, as was done in this case, alleges a deficiency in the pleadings. There is as well a “factual attack,” which challenges whether the alleged facts justify jurisdiction. Distinguishing, in the setting of this dispute, a facial from a factual attack, the Court, wrote:
If the defendants here had challenged the factual existence of jurisdiction, Lincoln Benefit would have been required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence, after discovery, that it was diverse from every member of both defendant LLCs. Instead, however, the defendants mounted a facial challenge to the adequacy of the jurisdictional allegations in Lincoln Benefit’s complaint. 2015 WL 5131423,* 3.

      In reliance, at least in part, on the decision rendered in Lewis v. Rego, Co., 757 F.2d 66 (3rd Cir. 1985), and as well limiting Chem. Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.3d 210, 222 n. 13 (3rd Cir., 1999), for the proposition that “rather than affirmatively alleging the citizenship of the defendant, a plaintiff may allege that the defendant is not a citizen of the plaintiff’s state of citizenship.” To the effect that:
A State X plaintiff may therefore survive a facial challenge by alleging that none of the defendant association’s members are citizens of States X. Id. at *4.
provided that the plaintiff has undertaken reasonable inquiry in support thereof. To that end:
[B]efore alleging that none of an unincorporated association’s members are citizens of a particular state, a plaintiff should consult the sources at its disposal, including court filings and other public records. If, after this inquiry, the plaintiff has no reason to believe that any of the Association’s members share its state of citizenship, it may allege complete diversity in good faith. The unincorporated association, which is in the best position to ascertain its own membership, may then mount a factual challenge by identifying any member who destroys diversity. Id.

Explaining the rationale for its holding, the Court wrote:
We believe that allowing this method of pleading strikes the appropriate balance between facilitating access to the courts and managing the burdens of discovery. District courts have the authority to allow discovery in order to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Rule 8(a)(1), however, serves a screening function: only those plaintiffs who have provided some basis to believe jurisdiction exists are entitled to discovery on that issue. The corollary of this principle is that a plaintiff need not allege an airtight case before obtaining discovery.
 
Depriving a party of a federal forum simply because it cannot identify all of the members of an unincorporated association is not a rational screening mechanism. The membership of an LLC is often not a matter of public record. Thus, a rule requiring the citizenship of each member of each LLC to be alleged affirmatively before jurisdictional discovery would effectively shield many LLCs from being sued in federal court without their consent. This is surely not what the drafters of the Federal Rules intended.
 
Moreover, the benefits of such a stringent rule would be modest. Jurisdictional discovery will usually be less burdensome than merits discovery, given the more limited scope of jurisdictional inquiries. It seems to us that in determining the membership of an LLC or other unincorporated association, a few responses to interrogatories will often suffice. So long as discovery is narrowly tailored to the issue of diversity jurisdiction and parties are sanctioned for making truly frivolous allegations of diversity, the costs of this system will be manageable. Id. at * 5.


      This opinion was followed by a concurrence written by Judge Ambro that, while not specifically commenting upon this dispute, urged the U.S. Supreme Court to in effect abandon the rule of Carden v. Arkoma Associates, 494 U.S. 185 (1990), and allow at least limited liability companies, notwithstanding the fact that they are unincorporated, to proceed under the rules for determining citizenship that are applicable to corporations.
      Assuming the reasoning employed in the Lincoln Benefit decision is followed by the other circuits, this could be a most important decision. First, it significantly undercuts the large number of decisions that, to date, have held that citizenship must be pled specifically and not on information and belief.  See, e.g., Principle Solutions LLC v. Feed.Ing BV, Case No. 13-C-223 (E.D. Wisc. June 5, 2013) (“It is well-settled that a plaintiff claiming diversity jurisdiction may not do so on the basis of information and belief, only personal knowledge is sufficient.”); Pharmerica Corp. v. Crestwood Care, LLC, No. 13C 1422, 2015 WL 1006683 (E.D. Ill. March 2, 2015) (“[I]t is not sufficient to assert jurisdiction based on information and belief.”); MCP Trucking, LLC v. Speedy Heavy Hauling, Inc., 2014 WL 5002116 (D. Colo. Oct. 6, 2014) (denying jurisdictional discovery and remanding action to state court even as it acknowledged that further discovery in that forum could demonstrate that diversity exists, leading to subsequent removal); Lake v. Hezebicks, 2014 WL 1874853 (N. D. Ind. May 9, 2014) (allegations of subject matter jurisdiction must be based on personal knowledge and may not be based upon information and belief and collecting cases to that effect). Further, it stands in direct challenges to those decisions that have held that citizenship must be affirmatively pled and that negative statements as to citizenship are insufficient. See, e.g., D.B. Zwirn Special Opportunities Fund, LP v. Mehrotra, 661F.3d. 124 (1st Cir. 2011), citing Cameron v. Hodges, 127 U.S. 322 (1888). While it may do nothing to address the fact that diversity jurisdiction may be unavailable consequent to de minimis indirect ownership (see, e.g., Fadal Machining Centers, LLC v. Mid-Atlantic CNC, Inc., 2012 WL 8669, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 48 (Jan. 3, 2012), Alphonse v. Arch Bay Holdings, L.L.C., 2015 WL 4187585 (5th Cir. July 13, 2015)), it does limit the ability of a defendant to “hide the ball” as to its citizenship while objecting that the other side has not adequately pled citizenship and therefore diversity.

Tuesday, September 8, 2015

More Confusion on Charging Orders


More Confusion on Charging Orders

      As previously noted (HERE IS ALINK to that posting), recently the Colorado Court of Appeals held that a charging order issued by a foreign court could be enforced in Colorado against a Colorado LLC only if it, in addition to the judgment for whose enforcement it was entered, were domesticated in Colorado. In effect, the court held that a charging order entered by a foreign court against an interest in a Colorado LLC could not be enforced absent domestication of the charging order.
      Fine, but now a decision from the U.S. District Court in Utah has, in effect, held to the reverse. Earthgrains Baking Companies, Inc. v. Sycamore Family Bakery Inc., Case No 2:09CV523DAK, 2015 WL 5009376 (D. Utah Aug. 21, 2015).
      Earthgrains held a judgment in the range of $6,000,000 against Sycamore Family Bakery and Leland Sycamore, its 48% member. This decision was rendered, in part, in response to Earthgrain’s motion for sanctions against Sycamore Family LLC for failure to make distributions, which would be captured by the charging order, to Leland even as distributions were made to his spouse, Jeri, the other 48% member. Ultimately, the court punted on sanctions, stating that additional discovery is needed. However, in doing so it rejected Sycamore’s assertion that the charging order is invalid “because it was entered under Utah law instead of Nevada law, which it submits is the proper law on the basis that the LLC was organized in Nevada.” In rejecting that assertion, it noted that a charging order does not implicate the internal affairs of the LLC, which are governed by the laws of the jurisdiction of organization, but rather governs the rights of a third party vis-a-vis the LLC.
      Based upon the information provided, the Earthgrains’ decision, being largely in response to a motion for contempt, is somewhat skimpy on the background facts, in one instance we have a court saying that the charging order cannot be enforced until it is domesticated even as another court says that an LLC with notice of a charging order (no suggestion that domestication is necessary) can be held in contempt for not complying with it.  Charging orders, of themselves, are already confusing. These disagreements among various courts as to procedural requirements are only making it worse.

Friday, September 4, 2015

It’s Official: Hot Coffee is Hot


It’s Official: Hot Coffee is Hot

      In a just rendered decision, the Kentucky Court of Appeals rejected a plaintiff’s claims that a McDonald’s restaurant should be responsible after she tripped and spilled hot coffee on herself.  Faesy v. JG 1187, Inc. d/b/a McDonald’s Restaurant, No. 2014-CA-001367-MR (Ky. App. Sept. 4, 2015).  This particular decision is designated as “not to be published.”
      Margie Ann Faesy entered a McDonald’s restaurant in Lexington and purchased a number of beverages, including a hot coffee. While leaving the restaurant with the drinks in a carrier, she tripped, spilling the hot coffee on herself. In response to burns she suffered from the hot coffee, she filed a negligence action against the restaurant based upon, essentially, an assertion that the coffee was excessively hot. In contrast, she made no allegations to the effect that her fall could be in any manner blamed upon this particular McDonald’s restaurant.
      The trial court dismissed her lawsuit on the basis that, essentially, the fall was her own fault and therefore the consequences thereof were likewise her fault. That determination would be adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals. In addition, after discussing prior law dealing with claims based upon firearms, it wrote that:
A hot cup of coffee is also, to a much lesser extent [than is a firearm] inherently dangerous; as the circuit court indicated, everyone understands or should understand that hot coffee (which Faesy specifically ordered) is hot, and hot things cause burns.  However, it does not necessarily follow that a restaurant that serves such beverages is liable in damages to each person burned by such beverages. Here, despite Faesy’s allegation that 195 to 205 degrees was an excessively hot temperature for her cup of coffee, there is nothing of record illustrating that Faesy’s cup of coffee was any hotter than the temperature of coffee she would have received in any other restaurant, or hotter than the industry standard for coffee temperatures in general.… Moreover, hot beverages are most certainly not within the category of those substances or chattels which by their very nature are not only inherently dangerous, but unsafe for general use. Slip op. at 7-8.