Monday, April 23, 2012

Forleo v. American Products Overruled


Forleo v. American Products of Kentucky, Inc. Has Been Legislatively
Overruled – The Reinstatement of an Administratively Dissolved
Organization is Effective as to the Organization’s Agent

      In Forleo v. American Products of Kentucky, Inc., 2006 WL 2788429 (Ky. App. 2006), notwithstanding the reinstatement of the corporation, the Court of Appeals held that the shareholders/officers/directors who, in the period of dissolution prior to reinstatement, entered into a contract with a third-party would be held personally liable thereon.  In 2007, the statutes were amended to overrule Forleo as to corporate shareholders and LLC members, it being stated that the administrative dissolution does not deprive them of the otherwise applicable rule of limited liability.  See Thomas E. Rutledge, The 2007 Amendments to the Kentucky Business Entity Statutes, 97 Kentucky Law Journal 229, 239-243 (2008-09).
      Now addressing the broader issue, namely the liability of an agent for actions undertaken during the period of administrative dissolution but prior to the reinstatement, various of the acts have been amended to expressly provide that upon reinstatement, the liability of any agent acting on behalf of the administratively organization shall be determined as if the administratively dissolution “had never occurred.”  See 2012 H.B. 341, amending KRS § 14A.7-030.
      This amendment has the effect of affirming the holdings of Judge Coffman rendered in eServices, LLC v. Energy Producing, Inc., reviewed here on February 22, 2012, and that of the Court of Appeals in Pannell v. Shannon, 2011 WL 3793415 (Ky. App. Aug. 26, 2011).

Friday, April 20, 2012

Foreign Entities Seeking Contracts with Kentucky Must Qualify to Transact Business

Foreign Entities Seeking State Contracts Must
be Qualified to Transact Business in Kentucky


      The rules for when a particular business organization must qualify to transact business are at best confusing.  See KRS § 14A.9-010.  The statute does not define what is “transacting business,” but only recites activities that of themselves do not constitute transacting business.  Foreign business entities receiving state contracts have often been able to avoid qualification by falling into one of those exemptions from what is transacting business. 

      Under amendments made by 2012 H.B. 341, any foreign business organization, as a prerequisite to receiving a state contract, must be qualified to transaction business in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.  Further, for an entity holding a state contract must maintain its qualification to transact business through the contract’s term. 

       For most business organizations, that qualification will be by means of a certificate of authority, although if the foreign entity is a limited liability partnership it will be by means of a statement of foreign qualification.  Further, for those foreign partnerships that are themselves not limited liability partnerships, they may qualify to transact business, solely for the purpose of qualifying to receive a state contract, by means of a certificate of authority.  Otherwise, it remains the law that a foreign general partnership, not an LLP, not only need not qualify to transact business, but there is no mechanism by which they may do so.  See 2012 H.B. 341, §§ 84, 85, 86 and 87.

Wednesday, April 18, 2012

Patmon v. Hobbs Overruled by Ky General Assembly

Patmon v. Hobbs is No Longer Good Law - Violation of the Duty of Loyalty in Partnerships and LLCs Not Subject to “Fairness” Defense
In Patmon v. Hobbs, 280 S.W.3d 589 (Ky. App. 2010), the Court of Appeals both permitted a “fair to the LLC” defense to the appropriation of a company asset and as well imposed on the plaintiff the burden of proving lack of fairness.  As has been previously reviewed, both these determinations went far astray from the predecessor law on the duty of loyalty in partnerships and LLCs under which the appropriation of an asset is, without informed sanction by the other participants in the venture, improper and for which “fairness” is not a defense.  See Thomas E. Rutledge and Thomas E. Geu, The Analytic Protocol for the Duty of Loyalty Under the Prototype LLC Act, 63 Ark. L. Rev. 473 (2010).
In response, amendments to the LLC and partnership acts make clear that “fairness” is not a defense to the appropriation of a partnership or LLC asset.  See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 275.170(3); id. § 362.1-404(5); and id. § 362.2-408(5), each as amended by 2012 H.B. 341.

Tuesday, April 17, 2012

Client, Not Bank, Responsible for Not Identifying Evidence of of Embezzlement

Court of Appeals Holds Client, and Not Bank, Responsible
For Not Recognizing Evidence of Embezzlement Scheme

        A recent ruling of the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the customer of the bank, and not the bank, would bear responsibility for not recognizing the evidence of an employee’s embezzlement.   Dean v. Commonwealth Bank & Trust Co., 2012 WL 1137907 (Ky. App. April 6, 2012). 
      Mark D. Dean, PSC (“Dean”) maintained a banking account with Commonwealth Bank & Trust Co.  Both Mark Dean and his bookkeeping/secretary, Jody Willis, were signatories on the Commonwealth account; only one signature was required to effect transactions in the account.  The Deposit Account Agreement provided that the client is “responsible for promptly examining your statement each statement period and reporting any irregularities to [Commonwealth].”  Willis thereafter began a check-kiting scheme, and in furtherance thereof began diverting the monthly bank statements to preclude Mark Dean from reviewing them and thereby learning of her activities.

      Responding to indications of suspicious activity in the account, and at Commonwealth’s request, Mark Dean held a meeting with them in February 2005; activity in the account ceased the following month.  In September 2008, law enforcement contacted Mark Dean regarding Willis’ unlawful activities.  In January 2009, Dean filed suit against the bank, alleging that it aided and abetted the illegal activity, breached its duty of care, committed common law negligence and breach of contract, and violated its duty of good faith and fair dealing.  Ultimately, Commonwealth was granted summary judgment on all of the claims against it, from which Dean appealed.

      The summary judgments in favor Commonwealth were upheld.
      Dean relied upon KRS § 355.4-111, in setting forth a general three-year statute of limitations that, combined with a discovery rule, he asserted it allowed him to pursue his claims against the Commonwealth.  The Court reject that analysis, holding that KRS § 355.4-406 controlled.  Under that statute, the customer has a duty to examine bank statements in a prompt and reasonable manner and “must exercise reasonably promptness in examining the statement of the items to determine whether any payment was unauthorized” and then “the customer must promptly notify the bank of the relevant facts.”  KRS § 355.4-406(3).  The statute goes on to require that the customer act within a year or waive any right from moving against the bank with respect to a transaction effective pursuant to the unauthorized signature or alteration.  KRS § 355.4-406(6).  Citing as well Concrete Materials Corp. v. Bank of Danville & Trust Co., 938 S.W.2d 254 (Ky. 1997), the Court found that any of Dean’s claims against the bank were barred by the failure to act within one year of the receipt of the statements from which evidence of the illegal activity could have been ascertained.  “Dean’s dilatoriness is an inadequate basis for concluding that it could not reasonably discover the unauthorized payments.”  2012 WL 1137907, *5.
      In addition, the Court of Appeals noted that from 2006, the official comments to the UCC are adopted as expressing the legislative intent of the Kentucky General Assembly.  Consequently, “it behooves both bench and bar to read these official comments in their entirety.”  2012 WL 1137907, *3, fn. 1.

Monday, April 16, 2012

Preserving Limited Liability in LLPs and LLLPs

Preserving Limited Liability in LLPs and LLLPs

The 2012 Kentucky General Assembly approved amendments to the limited liability provisions of KyRUPA and KyULPA that serve to preserve the expected rule even after the limited liability status has been, at least prospectively, forfeited.
           These changes respond to the ruling of the Fifth Circuit in Evanston Ins. Co. v. Dillard Department Stores, Inc.,  602 F.3d 610 (5th Cir. 2010). A law firm, organized as a limited liability partnership (“LLP”) in Texas, infringed on the trademark of the Dillard’s Department Stores.  Evanston, the firm’s malpractice carrier, intervened seeking a declaration that its policy did not provide coverage for Dillard’s claims.  While the litigation was pending the firm dissolved and the election of LLP status was allowed to expire.  Thereafter, judgment was extended in favor of Dillard’s against the firm.  When the judgment was not collected against the now defunct firm, Dillard’s filed a complaint seeking to hold the firm’s partners personally liable on the judgment.

The defendant partners, relying upon the liability shield provision of Texas partnership law (TRPA § 3.08(a); see also 602 F.3d at 614-15), asserted they were not personally liable on the partnership’s debts in that the grounds therefore, the trademark infringement, took place while their firm was registered as a LLP.  Ruling in favor of Dillard’s, the Court determined that the language of the statute looked to when the obligation, as contrasted with the predicate conduct, arose.  Under this analysis, as the judgment was entered when the partnership was not an LLP, the partners are personally liable on the judgment.
         With the amendments made to KRS §§ 362.1-306(3) and 362.2-404(3), the analysis will be upon whether the predicate conduct, as contrasted with the finding of liability, took place while the firm was an LLP.  2012 H.B. 341, §§ 115, 121.  It will now be a more streamlined process to dissolve an LLP, avoiding, for example, the need to keep the statement of qualification in place and effective.  It will also avoid the argument that registration as an LLP after the predicate conduct but before judgment is entered may be effective to avoid personal liability.

Friday, April 13, 2012

Effect of Assigning Entire Economic Interest in LLC Clarified

Dissociation of an LLC Member upon Having
Transferred All of Their Interest in the Venture Clarified


      A member of an LLC may unilaterally (and here assuming no contrary provision in the operating agreement) convey his economic interest in the venture.  That conveyance does not, however, convey any right to participate in the management and affairs of the LLC.  However, having conveyed his entire economic interest in the venture, the member is subject to having his right to further participate in the management and affairs of the company terminated, that termination being effected by a dissociation approved by the remaining members.
      A revision made to the LLC Act, namely the addition of “that they may unilaterally transfer,” addresses the argument that not “all” of a member’s interest has been conveyed, and therefore he cannot be dissociated, because the non-transferrable rights to participate in management have not been transferred.  See 2012 H.B. 341, amending KRS § 275.180.  Ergo, it is clear that when a member has transferred all of his economic interest in a venture, he is thereafter subject to dissociation by the other members.

Thursday, April 12, 2012

Single Shareholder Corps and Single Member LLCs are not for that Reason Subject to Piercing

Partial Codification of the Law of Piercing the Veil

In Rednour Properties, LLC v. Spangler Roof Services, LLC, No. 2009-CA-001159-MR, 2011 WL 2535330 (Ky. App. June 10, 2011, modified July 8, 2011), the Kentucky Court of Appeals justified a decision to pierce the veil of an LLC on the basis that it had a single owner who organized it for the purpose of achieving limited liability.  For a general review and criticism of this decision, see Thomas E. Rutledge, The Limited Liability Shield in Kentucky Single Member LLCs Has Been Thrown into Doubt by the Court of Appeals, kentuckybusinessentitylaw.blogspot (Nov. 7, 8 and 9, 2011).

In response to this holding, the 2012 Kentucky General Assembly amended both the business corporation act and the LLC act to provide that having only a single shareholder or a single member or manager is not of itself a basis for piercing the veil. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 271B.6-220(2) and 275.155(1), each as amended by 2012 Ky. H.B. 341.   

As both single shareholder corporations and single member LLCs are permissible, being so organized is not a basis for piercing.