This blog, written by Thomas E. Rutledge, focuses primarily on business entity law in Kentucky. Postings on contract law, contractual and statutory construction, and the entity law of other jurisdictions appear as well. There may as well be some random discussions of classical, medieval and renaissance history.
Tuesday, March 27, 2012
Delaware Court of Chancery Addresses Issue of First Impression in Connection with an LLC Dissolution
Delaware Court of Chancery Addresses Issue of First Impression in Connection with an LLC Dissolution
Tuesday, March 20, 2012
“Virtually Impossible” Not a Defense to Obligation to Prove Diversity
“Virtually Impossible” Not a Defense to Obligation to Prove Diversity
In a recent decision the District Court for the Southern District of Illinois has held that there is not a “virtually impossible” exception to the obligation to prove the existence of complete diversity among the parties. James v. Myers, 2012 WL 525583 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 2012).
Defendant Super Service, LLC, a Delaware LLC with a principal place of business in Michigan, removed the action to the federal court on the basis of diversity, alleging no more than that in its Notice of Removal. In that the Notice of Removal “inadequately alleged Super Service LLC’s, [sic] citizenship,” the Court ordered additional briefing, which revealed that the LLC’s sole member is another LLC and its sole member is a limited partnership, Wayzata Opportunities Fund II, LP (“Wayzata”). But here the trail came to an end; information as to the partners in Wayzata was not provided. The Court wrote:
However, defendants argue, Wayzata is an “investment fund with tens of thousands of investors,” it is “virtually impossible” for it to allege the citizenship of its members.” Thus, defendants argue this Court should “confer jurisdiction over this matter on the basis that Super Service, LLC, Super Service Holding, LLC and Wayzata Opportunities Fund [II], LP are not organized or principally located in the same state as the Plaintiff. 2012 WL 525583, *2.
Rejecting that invitation, the District Court observed:
[T]he Seventh Circuit has made abundantly clear that the Court must consider the citizenship of all the members of defendant Super Service, LLC, through the pertinent limited liability company, Super Service Holding, LLC, through all the layers of ownership of the pertinent limited partnership, Wayzata, until the Court reaches only individual human beings and corporations. 2012 WL 525583, *3.
Responding to the lament that it could not meet the burden imposed, the Court held:
…as defendants admit it is “virtually impossible” to allege the citizenship of Wayzata’s members, defendants have not met their burden of presenting competent proof, or a reasonable probability, that complete diversity exist among the parties. Id.
This holding pairs nicely with that of the 9th Circuit in Fadel Machinery Center, LLC v. Mid-Atlantic CNC, Inc., 2012 WL 8669 (9th Cir. Jan. 3, 2012), and its rejection of the suggestion that there is a de minimis exception to the requirement of complete diversity.
Monday, March 19, 2012
Conveyance of Assets to LLCs Challenged as Fraudulent Conveyances
Conveyance of Assets to LLCs Challenged as Fraudulent Conveyances
An Oklahoma court has recently considered whether the capitalization of a pair of LLCs would be set aside as a fraudulent conveyance. Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Tolliver, 2012 WL 524414 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 16, 2012)
In a post-judgment collection proceeding, Scottsdale learned that, in March 2010, Michael and Sandra Tolliver had transferred assets into a pair of LLCs in which they were the two equal members. These transfers took place subsequent to the entry of the $140,000 judgment against the Tollivers, and the LLCs admitted that the transfers were made to them after entry of the judgment for the attorney’s fees. 2012 WL 524414, *3. Scottsdale , appreciating that the entry of a charging order against each Tolliver’s interest in the LLCs likely would not yield funds to satisfy the judgment, sought to set aside the transfers as having been themselves fraudulent.
Applying the Oklahoma fraudulent transfer law, while implicitly accepting the determination that the conveyances were made “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor,” the Court found on the evidence presented there was no showing that the Tollivers, either at the time of the transfer or consequent thereto, were insolvent. On that basis, the matter was remanded to the magistrate judge for a supplemental report as to the question of insolvency.
Thursday, March 15, 2012
Beware the Ides of March
Et tu, Brute?
The above was not said by Julius Caesar.
Today, the Ides of March, marks the anniversary of the assassination of Julius Caesar in 44 B.C. Caesar was famously assassinated at a meeting of the Roman Senate after having (almost certainly apocryphally) been warned to “Beware the Ides of March.” He was presented with a written warning of the conspiracy against him as he was taken to the Senate meeting, but seems to have never read the warning. Although stabbed twenty-three times by the various conspirators, only one wound was fatal.
Caesar’s death unleashed upon the tottering Roman Republic the Second Civil War of Caesar’s heir Octavian (later to be Caesar Augustus) and his compatriot Marc Antony (Lepidus, the third member of the Second Triumvirate, was a place holder) against the assassins and their various supporters. Assassins Brutus (Marcus Junius Brutus the Younger) and Cassius (Gaius Cassius Longinus) would each commit suicide after losing a phase of the Battle of Philippi, and Cicero (who was not himself part of the conspiracy) would be assassinated as part of the proscriptions after the victory of the Second Triumvirate. Still later Octavian and Antony would turn on one another, Antony ’s forces being routed at Actium .
But back to Caesar’s dying words. “Et tu Brute” is not recorded by any classical historian – it is a quote from Shakespeare. Plutarch, who was born exactly 100 years after the assassination, reports that Caesar said nothing after the attack began in earnest. Suetonius wrote that others reported his last words to be “καὶ σύ, τέκνον” (Greek still being the lingua franca of the Romans), transliterated as “Kai su, teknon” or “You also child,” addressed to Brutus. There were rumors, later reported by Plutarch (Suetonius is silent on the topic) that Caesar was in fact Brutus’ father – it was known that Brutus’ mother Servilia was Caesar’s mistress.
Wednesday, March 14, 2012
Automatic Stay Not Violated by Bank's Action Against Non-Debtor LLC
Banks Actions to Collect on LLC’s Debt Did Not
Violate Automatic Stay in Favor of LLC’s Members
A decision of the Bankruptcy Court has (correctly) held that the lender to the LLC did not violate the automatic stays that arose when each member filed for bankruptcy protection, but its discussion of substantive LLC law was at best muddled. In re Jorgensen, 2011 WL 6000871 (Bankr. D. Wyo. Nov. 30, 2011).
Ted and Cynthia Jorgensen, debtors in bankruptcy, were the two members in Grand Interiors of Star Valley, LLC (“Grand Interiors”). It does not appear that Grand Interiors was a debtor in bankruptcy. Grand Interiors was indebted to the Bank of Jackson Hole (the “Bank”) under a secured promissory note. After the Jorgensens filed for bankruptcy the Bank sent them notice of Grand Interior’s default under the note and thereafter served Ted Jorgensen, the LLC’s registered agent, with the summons and complaint in the Bank’s action against the LLC. The Jorgensens asserted that these acts, as well as the Bank requesting to review and recover the collateral, violated the automatic stay in that the collateral was property of the bankruptcy estate.
The assertion that the automatic stay was violated was easily dismissed, it being noted that the Bank received, as to the collateral, relief from the automatic stay. While, it would seem, the story could have there ended, the Court continued with a stroll through the Wyoming LLC Act. Unfortunately that stroll involved, it would seem, a few skips and jumps that are not detailed in the opinion. Also, it would have been nice had the Court set out a rule (and here I assume this to be the correct rule) that advising the representatives of the LLC (it not being in bankruptcy) of action being taken against it is not a violation of the automatic stay even if that representative is themselves in bankruptcy.
The Court began by reviewing the statute addressing the events that affect an LLC’s dissolution. As this statute does not provide that the bankruptcy of either one or all members causes the LLC’s dissolution, why this is relevant to the discussion is not clear. While the Wyoming LLC Act does provide that a member’s bankrtupcy does affect their dissociation from the LLC (Wyo. § 17-29-602(c)(vii)(A) (assuming the LLC is member-managed)), the Court never identified or applied this rule as the predicate of the discussion of the consequences of the LLC’s dissolution.
Getting past that point, the Court recited the statutory language to the effect that an LLC continues to exist after its dissolution and the statutes governing notice to known and unknown creditors of the LLC and the order in which assets are to be distributed.
There was no evidence that Grand Interiors wound up and distributed its assets in the manner required by the statues. 2012 WL 6000871, *5. In an apparent typo, the Court wrote “The Bank, based on the Wyoming Statutes, cannot have received any distribution of assets from Grand Interiors, as assets must first be distributed to creditors, and only then to members.” Id. Working on the assumption the “The Bank” should read “The Debtors,” the following observations are helpful:
In this case the Debtors gained possession of Grand Interiors’ assets, as they were the members, and should have been proceeding with the wind up of the dissolved LLC. However, their possession of the assets does not equate to ownership.
The dissolution of Grand Interiors triggered the winding up process. The members of the dissolved LLC, Grand Interiors, did not automatically retain its assets as their own. The Debtors’ holding and distribution of these assets is strictly controlled by the Wyoming Statutes. Grand Interiors was required to “apply its assets to discharge its obligations to creditors.”
How the Court thought “possession” of the LLC’s assets went to the members upon dissolution is unclear. Still, its conclusion that the LLC’s assets were not part of the members’ respective bankruptcy estates is accurate:
The court finds that the collateral that secured the promissory note signed by the members of Grand Interiors, as an LLC, in favor of the Bank, is not property of the estate. Therefore, the Bank did not violate the automatic stay.
Tuesday, March 13, 2012
Charging Order does not Impact upon Management Rights
Entry of a Charging Order Does Not Divest a
Member of the Right to Participate in Management
A recent decision of the Nevada Supreme Court reiterated the rule that the entry of a charging order against an LLC member does not deprive the member of the right to participate in the LLC’s management. Waddell v. H2O, Inc., 128 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 9 (Nev. March 1, 2012).
After a somewhat meandering review of LLCs generally and charging orders in particular, including the limited rights afforded a judgment-creditor holding a charging order, the court reversed the decision of the trial court to the effect that the charging order divested the judgment-debtor of the right to participate in the LLC’s management.
That was not, however, the end of the story. Although the language of the subject operating agreement was not reviewed, apparently it provided a call right upon the entry of a charging order and dissociation upon the exercise of that call.
Irrespective of the discussion of charging orders, the Court made a noteworthy point as to participation in LLCs – “those who wish to enter into an LLC should be vastly familiar with [the LLC act] in order to properly protect their interests.”
Monday, March 12, 2012
No Pass Given on Demonstrating Diversity Exists
Complexity in Diversity Jurisdiction
A recent decision from Maryland highlights certain of the complexities involved when seeking to invoke diversity jurisdiction. Schaftel v. Highpointe Business Trust, 2012 WL 219511 (D. Md. Jan. 24, 2012).
Highpointe Business Trust, organized in Maryland (“Highpointe”), was successful in rebutting the plaintiff’s assertion that the citizenship of its beneficial owners/shareholders was relevant for determining diversity. Rather, the focus is upon the citizenship of the trustee and the court “need not consider the citizenship of the beneficiaries of the trust,” citing Navarro Sav. Assoc. v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 465 (1980). Having won that battle, however, it proceeded to nearly lose the war.
Highpointe’s trustee was HBT Beneficiary, LLC, a Delaware LLC with two members, each a limited partnership for which another limited partnership served as the general partner. Highpointe did not, however, provide information as to the various limited partners, asserting it:
…lacks sufficient knowledge concerning the structure and residency of these investors and suggests that its “right to remove this action should not be frustrated by its lack of sufficient knowledge concerning parties who invested in an entity several layers removed from the operations and control over [Highpointe]. Such peripheral analysis would not afford [Highpointe] due process to protecting its right to removal.”
The Court rejected this argument, noting both the settled law that the citizenship of all partners, general and limited, is assessed in determining citizenship, and that the “removing party bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction”:
By simply complaining that it is too cumbersome to parse its own structure, Highpointe does not meet its burden and the Court finds that Highpointe has not established that his action was properly removed.
The Court afforded Highpointe the opportunity to amend its Notice of Removal to address the question of the citizenship of the ultimate constituents of its constituents.
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