Monday, March 12, 2012

Treatment of Contingency Cases in Law Firm Breakup

The Complexities of Breaking Up –
Treatment of Contingent Fee Cases in Law Firm Dissolutions
LaFond and Sweeney were the two members of a law firm LLC.  They agreed orally to split equally all fees earned but made no agreement as to how firm assets, including contingency fee cases, would be divided upon the firm’s dissolution.  Of course, that dissolution came to pass.  LaFond v. Sweeney, 2012 WL 503655, No. 10CA2005 (Colo. App. Div. VI (Feb. 16, 2012)).
After the dissolution of the LLC, LaFond continued to represent the plaintiff in a contingent fee case on which “considerable work” had been done prior to the LLC’s dissolution.  Cutting to the chase, the Court found that:
·                    Because the contingent fee case was brought into the law firm before the firm dissolved, and because LaFond continued to handle the case until it was resolved, the contingent fee allocated to him as a result of the settlement is the firm’s asset.  Therefore, Sweeney also has rights in the contingent fee.
·                    LaFond owed the dissolved law firm fiduciary duties, including the duty to divide the firm’s assets with Sweeney in accord with the oral fee-sharing arrangement in place when the firm dissolved.  This duty extends to the contingent fee.
Speaking to these points, the Court wrote:
An attorney who carries on the representation of a client on an existing case after a law firm dissolves does so on the firm’s behalf.  Under section 7-80-401(1)(a)(b), C.R.S. 2011, a member must
[a]ccount to the [LLC] and hold as trustee for it any property, profit or benefit derived by the member or manager in the conduct or winding up of the [LLC’s] business
and
[r]efrain from dealing with the [LLC] in the conduct or winding up of the [LLC] business as or on behalf of a party having an interest adverse to the [LLC].
Thus, any income received by a member from winding up unfinished business belongs to the dissolved firm, and any attempt by the member to convert such business solely to his or her own business violates the duty owed to the dissolved firm.
Ultimately, the Court determined that the attorney who, after the dissolution of the firm, completed the contingent fee case was entitled to no more compensation from the fee earned thereon than they would have received under the pre-dissolution of sharing ratio.
It bears noting that as Kentucky utilizes the same statutory formula for a member’s duty of loyalty to the LLC as is utilized in Colorado (see KRS § 275.170(2)), this analysis should be equally applicable in this Commonwealth.

Friday, March 9, 2012

More on Piercing the Veil – Not Appropriate on the Pleadings

More on Piercing the Veil – Not Appropriate on the Pleadings
Issued the same day as Inter-Tel Technologies, Inc., in Schultz v. General Electric Healthcare Financial Services Inc. the Supreme Court addressed additional procedural issues in piercing claims.  2012 WL 593203, 2010-SC-000183-DG (Ky. Feb. 23, 2012).
Thomas Schultz was the sole shareholder Intra-Med Services, Inc., a corporation that entered into a lease agreement for certain medical equipment from GE.  Intra-Med subsequently defaulted on that contract, and GE received a judgment on its complaint, exceeding $4.7 million.  GE was able to collect approximately $700,000 of that judgment.
While in the collection phase, GE learned of documents in another lawsuit demonstrating that Schultz used Intra-Med assets for his own purposes.  For example, he had purchased properties using Intra-Med assets but retained to himself all of the gains on the subsequent sale of that property.  At least one of these sales took place after the entry of the judgment in favor of GE.  GE intervened in that other lawsuit, filing a complaint seeking to pierce the veil of Intra-Med and hold Schultz personally liable on its debt to GE.  In response, Schultz filed an answer including twenty-two affirmative defenses.
            Initially, the Court here emphasized that piercing is an equitable, and not a legal doctrine.  Slip op. at 8, relying upon the ruling of the Kentucky Court of Appeals Daniels v. DCB, LLC, 300 S.W.3d 204, 213 (Ky. App. 2009).  It bears noting that a similar determination by the Kentucky Court of Appeals was recently rendered in Killian v. Tunacakes Properties, Inc., 2012 WL 162717 (Ky. App. Jan. 20, 2012).
Having confirmed that the perspective to be employed is one of equity, the Court turned its attention to whether, in the context of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, piercing can be appropriate.  Ultimately the Court determined that making such a decision on the pleadings would be inappropriate:
In light of [the Court’s] obligation to respect the legal fiction of corporate separateness, trial courts should be very reticent to pierce at this juncture of litigation [judgment on the pleadings].  And, though we do not completely foreclose such action, we simply cannot conceive of a scenario in which a trial court could appropriately pierce the corporate veil based solely on pleadings raising a multitude of equitable issues.  Slip op. at 11.
Ultimately, the trial court was directed to reconsider these issues in light of the Inter-Tel Technologies decision.

Kentucky Supreme Court Updates Piercing the Veil Analysis

Kentucky Supreme Court Updates Piercing the Veil Analysis
            In a tour de force opinion by Justice Abramson, the Kentucky Supreme Court has reviewed and updated the analysis to be applied in piercing cases.  Inter-Tel Technologies, Inc. v. Linn Station Properties, LLC, 2012 WL 593194, 2009-SC-000819-DG (Ky. Feb. 23, 2012).
Integrated Telecom Services Corp. (“ITS”) was a subsidiary of Inter-Tel Technologies, Inc. (“Technologies”), it in turn being a subsidiary of Inter-Tel, Inc. (“Inter-Tel”).  ITS, prior to its acquisition by Technologies, entered into a lease with Linn Station Properties, LLC (“Landlord”).  That lease was not guaranteed by ITS’ owner, and the Landlord never requested, after ITS’ acquisition by Technologies, that Technologies guarantee the obligation.  ITS defaulted on the lease and abandoned the property.  In response to Landlord’s suit against ITS, Inter-Tel’s general counsel offered a default judgment, aware that ITS was judgment proof.  After entry of the default judgment, Landlord brought suit against Technologies and Inter-Tel, aiming to hold them liable on ITS’ obligation.
            It was ultimately determined that ITS, after its acquisition, “no longer possessed any financial independence.”  Slip op. at 6.  As evidence thereof, ITS did not have its own bank account, and any funds realized from the sale of equipment by ITS went into a lock box controlled by Inter-Tel.  All of the employees of ITS were in fact employees of Inter-Tel, paid by it from its headquarters in Arizona.  Vendors providing goods and services to ITS were paid by Inter-Tel, and all of ITS’ inventory was provided by another subsidiary of Inter-Tel, payment therefore being reflected by the means of intercompany transfers.  Inter-Tel paid ITS’ rent on the Linn Station property, and both Inter-Tel and Technologies were named insureds on the property insurance for the ITS facility on
Linn Station Road
.  Slip op. at 6.  In addition, all of ITS, Technologies and Inter-Tel in some or all years at issue had identical boards of directors and officer slates, although there was a failure to hold annual meetings.  The companies were treated interchangeably on various tax returns and financial statements.  Slip op. at 8-9.
            Relying in part upon Professor Stephen Presser’s treatise Piercing the Corporate Veil, the Supreme Court began its analysis by a general review of the development of piercing law nationwide, and from there focusing upon “Kentucky’s seminal and leading case on the subject,” namely White v. Winchester Land Development.  Slip op. at 10-13.  From there it reviewed in detail the White decision and its analytic antecedent, namely Professor Campbell’s article Limited Liability for Corporate Shareholders:  Myth or Matter – of Fact, 63 Ky. L.J. 23 (1975), both reciting the alternative (although acknowledged to be overlapping) theories of instrumentality, alter-ego and equity as alternative basis for piercing the veil.  However, where White focused upon a discreet list of five factors under the equity formula (Slip op. at 15-16), the Supreme Court has expanded that list to eleven, namely:
a) Does the parent own all or most of stock of the         subsidiary?

b)   Do the parent and subsidiary corporations have       common directors or officers?

c)   Does the parent corporation finance the subsidiary?

d)   Did the parent corporation subscribe to all of the capital      stock of the subsidiary or otherwise cause its        incorporation?

e)   Does the subsidiary have grossly inadequate capital?

f)    Does the parent pay the salaries and other expenses or        losses of the subsidiary?

g)   Does the subsidiary do no business except with the parent or does the subsidiary have no assets except           those conveyed to it by the parent?

h)   Is the subsidiary described by the parent (in papers or         statements) as a department or division of the parent or        is the business or financial responsibility of the    subsidiary referred to as the parent corporation's own?

i)    Does the parent use the property of the subsidiary as its       own?
j)    Do the directors or executives fail to act independently        in the interest of the subsidiary, and do they instead take orders from the parent, and act in the parent's       interest?
k)   Are the formal legal requirements of the subsidiary not         observed?,
the Court noting that “We believe that these are the most critical factors and that Kentucky courts should consider the aforementioned expanded list instead of focusing solely on the five factors identified more than thirty years ago in White.”  Slip op. at 19-20.

In further clarification of White, it was made express that while either “sanctioning fraud or promoting injustice” is a basis for satisfying, in part, the alter-ego test for piercing, it remains the rule that “the injustice must be something beyond the mere inability to collect a debt from the corporation.”  Slip op. at 21.  Still, proof or evidence of actual fraud is not required.  Id.
Applying these factors to the case at hand, the Court had no qualms about piercing both ITS and Technologies in order to hold Inter-Tel liable on the obligation at issue having stripped ITS of the opportunity to operate as a distinct legal organization holding assets with which to satisfy its obligations.  In this respect, the Inter-Tel decision parallels the holding of the U.S. District Court in the Hornblower decision, it piercing where the subsidiary was stripped of all income by the parent while being left with exposure to third parties under its contractual obligations.  Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government v. Hornblower Marine Services – Kentucky, Inc., 2009 WL 3231293 (W.D. Ky. 2009) 
The Supreme Court disposed of argument by Technologies and Inter-Tel to the effect that they should not be bound by the default judgment entered against ITS on the basis they were not before the Court.  The Court dismissed this argument, finding that, as ITS would be pierced to hold Technologies and Inter-Tel liable on its debts and obligations, such would include liability on the default judgment.  Ergo, those subject to exposure on a piercing claim are not going to be afforded the opportunity to re-litigate the underlying liability.
One troubling aspect of this decision is that the Supreme Court noted (although it did not otherwise expand upon the holding by the trial court) that piercing was available on the basis that ITS was the instrumentality or alter-ego of its parents “operated by them to achieve tax benefits and avoid various liabilities.”  See, e.g., Slip op. at 3; id. at 9 (“[Members of company management] explained ITS was continued as a separate entity after its acquisition by Technologies so that Inter-Tel could gain a tax advantage by offsetting income from other subsidiaries against ITS’ net operating loss.”)  While manifestly dicta, these statements unfortunately perpetuate the views that the utilization of a distinct entity for the segregation of liabilities or for achieving desired consequences under the tax code is somehow suspect and justifies piercing.  Hopefully, the point is no more than the utilization of a subsidiary to generate tax advantages for the parent even as creditors go unpaid is inequitable but not of itself sufficient to justify piercing.
Another quibble with the decision is the suggestion that the Kentucky Business Corporation Act, KRS 271B.-220(2), gives “statutory recognition to the veil-piercing doctrine.”  Slip op. at 21.  It is this provision of the Kentucky Business Corporation Act that provides that the limited liability normally afforded a shareholder does not protect a shareholder from “personal [liability] by reason of his own acts or conduct.”  Simply put, this provision relates not to a piercing analysis, piercing being premised upon the misuse of the corporate form, but rather upon an agency analysis whereby one who acts on behalf of the business organization is not protected from personal liability for his own torts.  See also Thomas E. Rutledge, The 2010 Amendments to Kentucky’s Business Entity Laws, 38 N. Ky. L. Rev 383, 384-88 (2011).  Rather, at this time, piercing is and remains, in the context of a business corporation, purely an equitable doctrine arising under the common law.

Wednesday, March 7, 2012

Corporate Directors Cannot Vote by Proxy

Corporate Directors and Proxy Voting –
Don’t Go There

From time to time I review corporate articles/certificates of incorporation and bylaws, often in connection with either general legal compliance audits or the issuance of opinion letters. Something I always enjoy is a provision providing that directors may vote by proxy. The only problem with these provisions is that they are invalid; directors of a corporation, be it for profit or nonprofit, cannot vote by proxy.

In Kentucky we actually have a case reciting this rule. Haldeman v. Haldeman, 197 S.W. 376, 381 (Ky. 1917); “Neither can they [directors] vote by proxy.” This holding is entirely consistent with the commentary, both dated and current.

• WILLIAM W. COOK, COOK ON STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS AND CORPORATION LAW (2d ed. 1889), § 592 at p. 659: “Directors, of course, cannot act or vote by proxy.” (citation omitted).

• II ARTHUR W. MACHEN, JR., A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF CORPORATIONS (Little, Brown & Co. 1908) § 1455: “Directors cannot vote by proxy.” (citations omitted). See also id. § 1458: “At a Directors’ meeting, votes by proxy cannot be received or counted, and the Directors have no power by resolution to alter this rule.” (citations omitted).

• 2 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER’S CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 427: “The directors of a corporation generally can not vote at directors’ meeting by proxy, but must be personally present and act themselves . . . . Their personal judgment is necessary, and they can not delegate their duties or assign their powers.” (citations omitted).

• HOWARD H. SPELLMAN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF LAW GOVERNING CORPORATE DIRECTORS (Prentice-Hall 1931) at 344: “It is the personal attention of the directors to the corporate affairs that underlies the purpose of the director’s meetings. It follows that a director may not deprive the stockholders of their right to his judgment by assigning his power to vote to another. Accordingly, it is unanimously held that directors must appear and vote in person and that they cannot give proxies to others, whether or not members of the board, to act in their place.”

• ABA CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK at p. 18: “A director is expected to commit the required time to prepare for, attend regularly and participate (in person when feasible) in board and committee meetings. A director may not participate or vote by proxy; personal participation is required (which may take place by telephone or video when in-person participation is not possible.)”

• MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.20, comment.

► An exception to this general prohibition on director proxy voting is Louisiana, which permits it in particular corporations that so provide in the articles of incorporation. See LA. CODE 12 § 81(E).

Wednesday, February 22, 2012

Forleo Again Rejected - Officer Not Liable on Contract Entered into During Administrative Dissolution

U.S. District Court Rejects Forleo, Holds Officer Not Personally Liable on Contract Signed While Company Administratively Dissolved
The fact pattern is straightforward – Company is administratively dissolved for failure to file its annual report.  Still it continues in operation and, on its behalf, an officer enters into an agreement with a third party.  Thereafter the Company is reinstated by the Secretary of State.  Eventually Company defaults on the contract, whereupon third party assets that the officer is personally liable on the agreement.  A recent decision of the District Court has rejected that assertion.  eServices, LLC v. Energy Purchasing, Inc., 2012 WL 404957 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 6, 2012).
The argument for officer liability is that from administration dissolution a company is restricted to activities appropriate for its winding up and liquidation.  See, e.g., KRS § 14A.7-020(3).  Actions accomplished by an agent purportedly on behalf of the dissolved company that exceed that limited scope involve purported agency on behalf of a principal who cannot so act.  Not actually acting on behalf of a competent principal, the agent may be held liable on the agreement.  See generally Thomas E. Rutledge, Dissolution of a Limited Liability Company § 9.5, in Limited Liability Companies in Kentucky (UKCLE 2010)
This argument begs a crucial question, mainly the impact of the company’s reinstatement.  The statute provides, inter alia, that reinstatement relates back to and has the effect of nullifying the prior administration dissolution.  See, e.g., KRS § 14A.7-030(3).  The principal’s incapacity having been retroactively cured, the agent was clothed with authority and is therefore not a party to or liable on the agreement.
Because Energy Purchasing was reinstated after Buchart signed the contracts, the corporation is treated as having been in existence when the contracts were signed…
2012 WL 404957,*2
eServices pinned its hopes on the Forleo decision in which, notwithstanding reinstatement, the corporation’s officers were held personally liable on an agreement entered into during the period of administrative dissolution.  Forleo v. American Products of Kentucky, Inc., 2006 WL 2788429 (Ky. App. 2006).  Judge Coffman dissected and discarded any application of Forleo, finding its reasoning unpersuasive, that it conflicts with the operation of the express statutory language and as well conflicts with the published Fairbanks decision.  2012 WL 404957, *2-3; Fairbanks Arctic Blind Co. v. Prather & Assoc., 198 S.W.3d 143 (Ky. App. 2005).
Hopefully this decision will serve as a final nail in the Forleo coffin.
All that said, there are two points in this opinion with which I would quibble.  There is an extensive discussion of limited liability, suggesting that it is the touchstone of the corporate form and must be afforded an officer with respect to obligations undertaken with respect to the corporation.  While limited liability is commonly perceived to be the most important aspect of the corporate form, and its availability has greatly enhanced capital formation for over a century, limited liability is not actually central to the corporate structure.  It is rather a late development with respect to the corporate form, and not all corporations have had this attribute.  Rather, the sine qua non of the corporate form has been continuity of life. 

        Of greater importance is the suggestion that the rule of limited liability somehow impacts upon whether an officer is or is not liable for a contract entered into in the name of the principal.  The rule of limited liability as set forth in the Kentucky Business Corporation Act extends exclusively to the shareholders; it is not this rule that affords either the directors or the officers limited liability from the debts and obligations of the entity.  See KRS § 271B.6-220(2) (referencing shareholders but not directors, officers or agents).  While officers are not personally responsible for the performance on and any default of an agreement entered into on behalf of a corporation, that absence of exposure arises not from the substantive law governing corporations (including the rule that shareholders enjoy limited liability), but rather from the common law of agency.  See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Agency § 6.01.  As to why directors are not liable for the debts and obligations of a corporation, in that directors are not agents, that is a discussion for another day.

Thursday, February 9, 2012

Improper Assignment of an LLC Interest – Breach of Contract or Void Ab Initio?

Improper Assignment of an LLC Interest – Breach of Contract or Void Ab Initio?

         A recent decision of the Colorado Supreme Court provides helpful guidance with respect to the treatment of anti-assignment provisions in an LLC’s Operating Agreement. Condo v. Conners, 2011 WL 6318980 (Colo. Dec. 19, 2011).

      Banner was one of three members of a Colorado LLC. That LLC’s Operating Agreement provided that “a Member shall not sell, assign, pledge or otherwise transfer any portion of [the Member’s] interest in [the LLC] without the prior written approval of all of the Members.” This provision went beyond the statutory provision to the effect that, while the right to participate in management is not assignable, the right to the economic fruits of the venture is freely assignable. Colo. § 7-80-702(1). Accord KRS § 275.255(i)(a)-(c). Banner, in the course of his divorce, sought to transfer his interest in the LLC to Condo, his former spouse, agreeing as well to exercise his retained management rights under her direction. Both of the other Members objected to this proposed assignment, but Banner went ahead and did it. Ultimately, Banner sold his interest in the LLC to the other two Members, whereupon Condo sued them on theories of tortious interference with contract and conspiracy.

      The validity of Condo’s claims depended upon whether the assignment to her was of itself valid. The trial court rejected the validity of that assignment, and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, but on other grounds.

      When the case came before the Colorado Supreme Court, it focused upon the alternative paradigms for the analysis of an anti-assignment clause. Classically, a violation of an anti-assignment clause was itself a nullity; no transfer took place in that the transferor lacked the capacity to accomplish that act. Under the modern approach, a violation of a limitation upon assignment is seen as a breach of contract pursuant to which the assignment is accomplished, but the assignor is liable for damages. Consequently, if the classic approach was applied, Condo’s interference of contract claim would fail in that she never received the purportedly assigned membership interest. Conversely, under the modern approach, the assignment would have taken place and Condo’s claims against the LLC’s two other members would at least survive summary judgment. 2011 WL 6318980,*7.

      The Colorado Supreme Court ultimately determined that the classical approach would be utilized, justifying that determination on a pair of grounds. First, the Colorado LLC Act contains a freedom of contract provision. Colo. § 7-80-108(4) (“It is the intent of this article to give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of operating agreements”). Kentucky utilizes the same rule in its LLC Act. See KRS § 275.003(1). This statutory directive was interpreted as sanctioning the capacity of the parties to an operating agreement to restrict, to the degree they determine appropriate, the assignability of any interest in an LLC. Second, utilizing the principles of in delectus personae, the Court thought it appropriate that the parties should be able to restrict the conveyance of any aspect of the interest in the LLC. As to this point, the Court cited with approval RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 7:5 (2011) (“[A]n assignment of financial rights could injure the non-assigning Members by diluting the assignor’s incentives to maximize the welfare of the firm. Thus, the parties should be able to control assignment by agreement.”)

      Ultimately, there having been no conveyance of the interest by Banner to Condo, Condo had no claim against the other members of the LLC.

      While no Kentucky court has yet reviewed this issue, on a similar fact pattern it would appear appropriate to follow the guidance of the Colorado Supreme Court. Kentucky’s LLC Act embodies the same flexibilities as does that of Colorado with respect to the ability of a written operating agreement to restrict the assignability of the economic rights in the venture, the same principle of maximum enforcement of operating agreements and the same principles of in delectus personae.

New York Court Addresses “Not Reasonably Practicable" Standard for LLC Dissolution

New York Court Addresses “Not Reasonably Practicable”
Standard for LLC Judicial Dissolution

      Under Kentucky law, an LLC may be judicially dissolved upon a showing that it is not reasonably practicable to operate the LLC in accordance with its operating agreement. KRS § 275.290(i). This standard was adopted from Section 902 of the Prototype LLC Act, the primary model for the original Kentucky Act. To date no Kentucky court, in a published decision, has interpreted this language. However, a recent decision of the New York Supreme Court (the trial court under the New York system) provides useful guidance both as to the interpretation of this language as well as addressing perceived inequities in dissolution. Mizrahi v. Cohen, 2012 WL 104775 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 12, 2012).

       Mizrahi and Cohen were equal owners in an LLC that owned a commercial office building. A portion of the building was leased to Cohen's professional practice, while another floor was rented to Mizrahi’s professional practice. The LLC was never able to satisfy its obligations from cash flow, and from the first year of operations additional capital was required from the members in order to keep the LLC current on its obligations. Initially Mizrahi and Cohen contributed equally, but after some period of time Cohen failed to keep up, and Mizrahi made disproportionate contributions. Ultimately, Mizrahi contributed some $900,000 to the LLC more than had Cohen. Ultimately, Mizrahi sued for judicial dissolution of the LLC.

       As to the standard to be employed in interpreting the “not reasonably practicable” threshold, in reliance upon In Re 1545 Ocean Ave., LLC, 893 N.Y.S. 2d 590 (N.Y. 2010), the Mizrahi court found that dissolution would be appropriate upon the petitioner’s demonstration that:

In the context of the terms of the operating agreement or articles of incorporation [sic-organization], that (1) the management of the entity is unable or unwilling to reasonably permit or promote the stated purpose of the entity to be realized or achieved, or (2) continuing the entity is financially unfeasible.
      In light of the LLC’s inability to support its operations from its own income, Cohen’s failure to contribute towards the satisfaction of those obligations and the acknowledgement that the LLC would entirely fail should Mizrahi cease making capital contributions, the Court determined that the operation of the LLC was not financially feasible. 2012 WL 104775, *8.

      Having determined that the LLC would be dissolved, the court turned to the mechanisms to be employed. The operating agreement at issue provided that upon liquidation and after satisfaction of creditor liabilities, the remaining assets would be distributed 50% to each member. The operating agreement did not require, as an intermediate step, the return of contributed capital to each of the members. The dissolution had been sought, at least partially, based upon the fact that Mizrahi had contributed $900,000 more to the LLC than had Cohen. Applying the operating agreement as written, Cohen would have received a windfall. For that reason, the court recharacterized Mizrahi’s additional $900,000 not as a capital contribution but rather as a loan to be satisfied before net assets were distributed amongst the members in accordance with the agreed 50%/50% sharing ratios.