Court of Appeals
Addresses Damages Arising from Breach of Lease
The Kentucky Court of Appeals
has issued helpful guidance with respect to the interpretation of commercial
lease agreements. Nohr v. Hall’s Rentals, LLC, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2013 WL 462004 (Ky.
App. Feb. 8, 2013).
Adrian Nohr, an individual,
leased office facilities for the operation of a chiropractic practice from
Hall’s Rentals, LLC. The lease, with a
five-year term, provided rent in the amount of $5,000 due on the first of each
month. The lease did not contain a
provision accelerating all rent due under the term of the lease upon its
breach.
By early 2010 (the opinion is
not more specific) Nohr was in default of his obligations to Hall’s. On February 24, 2010, the District Court
entered a forceable detainer judgment against Nohr, allowing him to remain in
the property for forty-five days provided a payment of $10,000 was made to Hall’s. That payment was made and Nohr vacated the
property at the end of the forth-five day period. Since that time Nohr has not had possession
of the property, and Hall’s undertook maintenance and similar obligations that
were to have been performed by Nohr.
Nohr as well undertook certain activities to re-let the property, all of
which were ultimately unsuccessful.
Hall’s as well filed suit
against Nohr, seeking damages under the contract for accrued but unpaid monthly
payments, maintenance obligations performed by Hall’s and attorneys’ fees. Nohr defended on the basis that, with Hall’s
successful eviction of him from the property, he had no further obligations
under the agreement, arguing that the “term” of the agreement had been
terminated thereby. Hall’s, in response,
noted that the contract language contemplates that upon default there may be
recovery for monthly rental expenses that accrue in the future. The contract provided:
DEFAULT. If
default is made in any payment of said rent, or any part thereof, within thirty
(30) days from the date said payment is due, or in fulfillment of any of the
covenants or agreements herein specified to be fulfilled by the Lessee, or if
any waste be committed or unnecessary damage done upon or to said premises, the
Lessor may, after thirty (30) days’ written notice to the Lessee and the Lessee
has not corrected said default, declare the said term ended and enter into
possession of said premises and sue for and recover all rent and damages
accrued or accruing under the lease or arising out of any violation thereof….
The trial court granted Hall’s
summary judgment with respect to its calculation of damages due and owing under
the lease and as well determining that Hall’s had engaged in activities
appropriate to mitigate damages. Nohr
appealed to the Court of Appeals.
With respect to Nohr’s
assertion that his obligations under the lease were terminated by Hall’s taking
possession of the property, the Court of Appeals, as had the trial court,
easily disposed of that argument, finding that the default provision of the
lease clearly contemplated that the lessee’s obligations would continue. In this respect, the court found that the use
of the term “accruing” to be important:
We agree with the trial court as we
believe that the language of [the default clause] plainly allowed Hall’s to
seek recovery of any future rent obligation as it accrued under the terms of
the lease. In our view, the fact that
the lease authorized Hall’s to “declare the [lease] term ended did not cancel
its right to pursue “all rent … accruing under this lease.” Instead, that language merely allowed Hall’s
to take action to evict Nohr and to
pursue a claim for rent and damages against him. The fact that the word “and” is used as a
conjunctive term between the specified remedies supports the conclusion that
they are not intended to be exclusive to one another. Moreover, the fact that the lease allows for
the collection of rent “accruing” even after eviction and repossession
indicates that Nohr’s requirement to satisfy his contractual rent obligation
did not cease once same occurred.
Turning, however, to the
question of mitigation, the Court of Appeals, while indicating its agreement
with the trial court, held that a determination on summary judgment that there
had been sufficient efforts to mitigate damages was inappropriate. “Thus, while we are inclined to believe that
Hall’s efforts to mitigate were sufficiently reasonable, such is not our
determination to make.” On which basis,
it reversed the similar determination by the trial court and directed that
determination be made by the finder of fact.
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